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PREFACE
The year 1931 was an epochal one in the economic
and social life of the entire world. Few, indeed, were
the corners of the earth that were not affected b/ some
kind of an upheaval or disorder. If we review the out-
standing events of the year, we see the important part
that gold played in the destinies of the nations. Mere-
ly to name a few of these disturbing events— the crisis
of the German Reichsbank, when its gold reserves were
so depleted that a moratorium was declared; the suspen-
sion of the gold standard by England, Sweden, Norway,
Holland, and Japan; the failure of Austria's largest
commercial bank; the unprecedented accumulation of gold
in France and the United States; the continuation of
the depression and deflation period throughout the
world--gives us a picture of the catastrophes that have
been taxing place throughout the world.
A realization of the importance of gold and a
desire to weave together the facts pertaining to the
gold standard were the inspiration which prompted this
dissertation. The author has endeavored to show the
part that gold has played in the financial background of
the leading nations and to explain, in the light of the
correlation of the characteristics of the gold standard,
the financial disturbances through which the world has
been and is still passing.
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CHAPTER
Its Functions
In the olden days the economics of the world were
very si iple. People were self-sufficient. Whatever
they had or consumed they x^rovided themselves. There
was no interdependence. As contacts became more numer-
ous and the desire for more than one could produce for
himself becaiae more widespread, the economic life began
to ta^ce on a more complex aspect. Thus the world
passed through the period of barter— the exchange of
one article for another. Civilization, however, is
ever on the move and the complexities of life were ever
increasing until the system of barter no longer suf-
ficed. With the growth of social and political organ-
izations the need and desire for more articles became
prevalent. No longer were people content to exist with
the mere necessaries of life. They wanted more of the
luxuries as well as a greater variety of both neces-
saries and luxuries. Due to these desires there came
about a system of a fixed medium of exchange. The
medium of exchange was not the same the world over.
Witness the situation ^j^ich the early settlers of
America found when they entered into trade with the
Indians. Warapum, which consisted of colored beads, was
the medium of exchange. And how far a few bushels of
corn went in those days! It was much liice the situatior
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found in what we of today consider the primitive days
of carter. But the Indians of America were priraitive
people. If we study history we will find that many
things have been ased as mGney--sach things as furs,
wheat, tobacco, iron, copxDer, and many others which we
might name.
So we come to the question- -what is money? We
have many definitions of money. One, ratner lengthy
"but inclusive, states thcit by money one means that
which is "(1) passed from hand to hand throughout a
community in payment for commodities and services, and
(2) regularly ta^en with the intention of offering it
in payment to others, and (3) customarily received
without assay or other special test of quality or quan-
tity, and (4) received without reference to or reliance
•J
upon the personal credit of tlie one who offers it."*^
In defining the term money, one of necessity does it in
terms of functions because in tliat way one can give the
clearest idea of money. Karl Marx has stated the func-
tions of money as being six in number: (l) A measure
of value, (2) a standard of price, (3) an ideal unit of
account, (4) a circulating medium, (5) the sole form of
, ,
3
exchange value, and [6} a means of payment. We can,
however, more succinctly state it as "a medium of ex-
change, a. common measure of value, a standard for
1 XIV--page 2 2 II--page 17 3 VII--page 2
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deferred payments, and a store of value,*
Let us briefly examine what is meant by the last
definition. In order that a coromodity be a medium of
exchange it must have certain qualities. It must be
easily transportable, it must have lasting qualities.
That is, it must be durable and indestructible. It
must be easily recogni/.ed and must be homogeneous and
uniform. It must be capable of divisibility and have
stability of value.
Before we can have a medium of exchange we must
have some standard in relation to which all things are
judged. If X is our standard, then Y may be worth sev-
eral times X, or Z may be worth only a fractional part
of X. Then, as many X*s as necessary can be exchanged
for Y, or for one X one could secure several Z*s. It
is all a relative matter. Some standard must be set
and then adhered to in all exchange processes. What-
ever the commodity may be that is chosen as the stand-
ard, that commodity has exchange valae and becomes the
common measure of value.
If one enters into a contract today in which settle-
ment is to be postponed until some future time, one is
naturally interested in and desirous of securing pay-
ment which will be comparable to the value of the serv-
ices rendered today. Thus the medium of payment must
1 XVI- -page 3 2 XIV--x;age 12
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be in accordance with some predetermined standard.
In determining our standard, we want to choose a
commodity vihich has lastin^j qualities, so that we can
save with little fear of much chan^^e in value. Thus
the standard becomes a store of value, for, by accu-
mulating or amassing the standard commodity, we are
storing away value for future use.
Each of these characteristics can be found sepa-
rately in many commodities but it is obvious that it
was necessary to find one commodity in which the com-
bined qualities would be found. Gold has been chosen
by most nations as the comiaodity which best combines
the desired qualities, although silver has been adopted
by some.

CHAPTER I I- -GOLD
Choice Of Gold As A Standard
Stability of value is the requisite of money which
was most difficult to find in any of the cororaodi ties
considered for the standard money. There is probably
no comiaodity in the world which has absolute stability
of value. Present conditions, just as the conditions
of many periods in the r)ast, have shown us that the
world is moving too rapidly, with chariij^es in our eco-
nomic life coming one after another in quick succession,
for us to l-iave any perfect standard. The next best
thing then was to find something as nearly perfect as
Xjossible, So the ultimate choice by the leading na-
tions of the world was gold. The fact that it has been
Xjossiole to accumulate a large stock of gold and that
this stock is not being appreciably increased has led
the nations to believe that the cnanges in demand and
supply, in the ordinary course of events, would not
lead to instability."*" Extraordinary events, of course,
would have to be dealt with as they occurred. The
situation of 1930-32 is one of these extraordinary
events and is unprecedented, needing special consider-
ation and treatment, a discussion of which will be
found in a later chapter.
Let us see how gold measures up to the other
1 VII--page 69
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standards necessary for the effective medium of ex-
change . ''
It can be transported at a relatively lev/ cost
in proxDortion to its voliime both in bulk and value,
and this leads to uniformity in the price of gold
throughout the world.
Gold lias lasting qualities. It does not rust or
corrode and the x-><*S!r)ing of time has little or no
effect upon its condition. It is permanent in its
existence, which gives it a decided advantage over
other coramodities which have been used as a medium of
exchange. It is not subject to consiimx^tion, as, for
instance, is rice, or subject to wear and tear, as were
furs. Hence it meets the demand of durability.
Gold is uniform. It is either pure or it is not
pure and its value can be determined very easily by
assaying.
Gold is easily workable and therefore easy to coin.
That is, it can be readily cut, shaped and stamped so
that it can be used for distribution. It can be divid-
ed without difficulty and without loss of value. Thus
it meets the test of divisibility.
The cost of production of gold is high. The mines
are located in comparatively fev/ places in the world.
Therefore there is a li:iit to the supply and an increase
1 XI I- -page 29
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in mining activities means an increase in an already
high cost of production, which is, in itself discour-
aging. This leads tc a stability in value because of
the stability of supply.
Meanin,-^ Of "Gold Standard**
When a country ox^erates on the 'gold standard*'
the follov/ing regulations, xti ich shov^ the significance
of this institution, are in force: (l) That there be
free and unlimited coinage of gold and of no other
metal; (2) that there be the right to redeem any other
form of money into gold upon demand; (3) that gold be
recognized as legal tender; and (4) that the currency
unit of the country be fixed in terms of gold. There-
fore, for a given amount of gold, one can secure a
fixed amount of currency, or for a given amount of cur-
rency obtain a stated amount of gold.
Gold As A Circulating Medium
At the present ti.ie there is very little gold
passing about as a circulating medium from person to
person. The movements of gold today are between nations.
Most people never see any gold except possibly at Christ-
mas time when there is some demand for five-dollar gold
pieces or a few other denominations. Even this demand
is diminishing and in late years, at any rate, existed
merely because the gold coin seemed more valuable than
the paper money or because it made a better showing as a
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gift, not because people really thoat^ht it was more
valuable.
If gold is the standard, yet does not circulate,
what is the medium of exchange? The answer is paper
money. Paper money is certainly more convenient to
carry around than gold coins would be, Knov^ing that,
according to the laws of the United States, there is a
gold reserve behind the paper money and that, if de-
sired, the paper money can be coiiverted into gold, the
people of this country have come to trust paper money
and have no hesitation in using it. In fact, so wide-
spread is the acceptance of paper money in the United
States, it is a rare person, indeed, who even questions
in his mind the desirability or undesirability of paper
money.
In the western part of the United States silver
dollars were for many years not only desired but de-
manded, out this is a condition which has just about
xmssed out of existence. During the past few years, in
ray travels, which have taken me over most of Europe,
South America, and the i^orth Arnerican continent, I have
never yet liad a shopkeeper refuse to take a dollar bill
in United States money. So widespread is the belief in
the financial integrity of the United States Crovernment
that the dollar bill is practically universally ac-
ceptea.

-10-
So , wniXe we a.re on a gold standard basis, the
e^old itself is held in reserve and does relatively
little circulatinei. This fact maices it possible to
increase the ••effective sapx^l/ of ejold'* because the
metal, not being needed for coinage can be used for
other purposes.'^ In Europe, most of t}ie coiintries have
used and are using both paper money and coins of silver
and other metals for small denominations as a substi-
tute for gold, just as the United States does.
Ciold Versus Bimetallism
Now that argtiments have been advanced which cul-
minated in the disclosure that gold was decided upon as
the standard, we can very well stop and say, "Would not
silver answer the same purpose? Has it not the same in-
herent qualities that gold has? ^JTliat advantages has
the gold standard over a silver standard? Why not have
both?"* These questions have long been dormant in the
minds of those who might thinic upon such a subject, but
the recent suspension of the gold standard by important
nations iias revived them. Of especial interest is, not
gold versus silver, but gold versus bimetallism. That
is to say, gold versus both gold and silver.
In examining the financial systems of the world,
we can find evidence of the use of both gold and silver
1 XVI- -page 8
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as standards. Both seeraed to liave the qualities
necessary for a standard. Operation under the double
standard, however, met with difficulties. The values
of ^old and silver are not, and never have been, the
same. Therefore it was necessary to determine upon a
ratio between the two so that it could be clearly un-
derstood how much of one metal was worth a stated amount
of the other. This was not easy because the value of a
commodity clianges from time to time according to the
supply and demand, which means that *the weight and
value of the two coins (meaning gold and silver) must
be fixed upon some assumed ratio of value between the
bullion of the two metals, and effective steps must 6e
taken to enforce this ratio permanently upon the actual
market values of the two metals.
We find evidence of coimtries doing just this
thing--attempting to maintain a definite ratio between
gold and silver, l^rance set up the ratio of 15-^ to 1^
which meant that it took 15^ silver francs to equal
3
1 gold franc, both being of the same fineness. This
ratio was maintained for a period of 70 years, from
4
1803 to 1873. It was finally given up and the gold
standard adopted because of the growing use of the gold
standard by the rest of the world,
1 XII- -page 60 2 XI I- -page 60
3 ''"fineness" means the aiQoimt of oure metal in a coin
4 XII- -page 60
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In Hrii^land we find the ratio of 154- to 1 fixed in
1717,"^ Silver, however, fell into disrepute because of
the very bad condition of the coins. Soon free coinage
of silver'' was stopped and ^jjold bec-ime the preferred
3
coin, the Act of 1816 makinii* clold the one standard.
The United States, in 1792, passed a law fixing
the ratio of silver to c^old at 15 to 1. Silver, how-
ever, was actactlly worth 15.3 to 1, so, because, by tak-
ing silver to tlie mint, one could secure 1 ounce of (<,old
LOT 15 ounces of silver, whereas, in the market, it tooK
15.3 ounces of silver to equal 1 o mce of gold, it can
clearly be seen that it was more advantageous to mint
silver than to use it to pay foreign debts. So gold
was shipx^ed out of the country and thus it no longer
4
circulated, because t?iere was little to circulate.
This is quite in accordance with G^reshara*s Jjav/ that bad
money will drive out good money or '•when two metals of
the same nominal value, but of different bullion value,
are freely coinable at the mints and of unrestricted
legal tender power, the metal tliat is overvalued at the
5
mint tends to drive the other from circulation." To,
correct this situation, the ratio was changed to 16 to
1 XI I- -page 61
2 '•'^ee coinage" of a metal is necessary if that coin
is to be used as a standard and "free coinage" means
that the mint must not refuse to coin the standard
metal, regardless of the amount of coins or bullion
in the treasury.
3 VIII--page 69 XII--page 62
4 VIII--page 67 5 VIII--page 67
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1, which this time overvalued gold, the market ratio
bein^i 15«7 to 1, and gold started to ret irn to the
United States. Thas we c^et a pictare of some of the
difficulties to be met irnrier the bimetallic system.
1
In 1873, the United States w<..nt on the (^old sthcndard.
There have been man/ efforts to revive bimetallism
in the world. In our omi country, the leading advocate
during the twentieth century was the v/ell-icnown William
Jennings Bryan, but he continually met defeat. Confer-
ences were aiiteiaoted to brin^, togetner various nations
but none were successful, How, in tne fall of 1^31,
many years after the adoption of tiie gold standard, there
is a renewed interest in bimetallism being displayed.
This is chiefly dJB to the lact of Great rJritain*s sus-
pension of the gold standard.
Great jiritain, once she went on tne gold standard,
was wholly disinterested in the subject of biie tall ism
and now she becomes tiie incentive, though not the advo-
cate, as we shall later see, for the reopening of this
subject of bimetallism,
A government operating under a metallic standard
for its currency agrees to buy the standard metal at a
given price. We have seen (page 12) how the United
States, when bimetallism was in force, changed the ratio
of silver to gold from 15 to 1 to 16 to 1. Now the
suggestion is 14 to 1, ich ratio is given because
"the rate of production of silver, in terms of
1 VIII--page 70
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weight, not value, has for several years been 14 times
as rajpid as the xDroduction of gold. Kvery time an
ounce of gold is ta/cen out of the earth, 14 oimces of
silver are found. ""^ A new idea to the front. It is
one, however, which would have practical diii icul ties
of operation and which would need widespread adoption
throughout the world, thus insuring absolute coox^eration
in the roaintenance of the standard ratio, Otherv^ise,
especially new v/ith the low raaricet price for silver, the
nation adopting the plan wo ild be delu^^od with silver.
However, there is little likelihood of such a plan being
adopted at the present ticie.
Bank Reserves
It has been stated previously that actually there
was very little gold in circu.is. tion in the form of
coins. This is a situation which could only corae about
from a strong confidence in the minds of the people that
the substitute for gold coins was as good as the gold it-
self, inasmuch as they found that the substitute paper
money was everywhere acceptable.'^ There must, however,
be some justification behind this confidence. Confidence
does not spring out of nowhere and depend upon faith
alone. The thin^^ing people have to have some good reason
for Gheir trust and the unthinking fall into step with
the leaders. The justification in this case lies in the
1 XX--a 2 II--page 82
October 2^, 1931
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gold reserves which are maintained by the banks to meet
the demands for conversion of paper money into gold coin.
Are the jold reserves eq lal to the paper money in
circulation? The answer is, oy no means. Bit the re-
serves mast be adequate. A careful study of what ''ade-
quate reserves'* are is, of course, necessary, and then,
having determined the amount, as nearly correctly as it
is humanly possible to do so, it is iniT)ortant tliat there
be a legal requirement as to the maintenance of the re-
serve
.
•The chief purpose of the gold reserve is to pre-
vent depreciation of paper money by adequately providing
I or 'its convertibility into gold. This object can be
achieved only by liiaitation of the vol.me of paper
1
money.** A crisis in the financial life of a nation
may lead the government to believe tJiat the remedy for
the critical situation is more circulating currency.
If the amount of psp er currency is increased without
likewise increasing the reserves, the situation will be
relieved only temporarily. As a resul^ of the larger
amount of currency in circulation, prices rise. The
country becomes choked with its own issues--issues
which are not redeemable in gold, the standard, and
therefore having no credit standing outside the is-
suing country, and not much standing within, I have a
picture in my mind of the German mark, after the close
of the War, being offered for sale by the millions, even
1 I I- -page 87
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billions, for an infini tesiiaitl aracunt of ITnited States
mone/'-the imrk that had formerly been worth ap^jroxi-
mately ?A0 before the ciovernment money presses got
basy printinc^ an extra large sijjly.
international Ti'low Of Gold
1 When Transfer Uf iiold Occurs
Gold has becoiae not only the str^ndard of the im-
^jortant nations of the world but it has become the
international standard among T^he comraercial nations.
It is not the usual procedure in business transactions
to take the paper currency of one country to another
country. It would be xjossible to convert the paper
money of one*s own country into gold, take the gold to
a second country and then buy the currency of the sec-
ond country with this gold. The excl-iange would then be
ccnple ted par to par, v/ithcut loss.
If gold had to be transferred, however, in every
international business transaction, the process of
trading would be very cumbersome. Therefore gold is
shipped from one country to another chiefly as payment
for the balance which is due betv/een the tv/o countries.
Instead of using gold for the payment of every
international transaction, drafts or bills of exchange
are used. These can be purchased from bani^ers who
deal in exchange Just as any merchant deals in merchan-
dise. The ban.-cer buys drafts drawn by local exporters
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on iFiporters of foreign countries, collects these
drafts in the "business centers of forei^-n countries,
and leaves the money received for them on deposit.
Then he can draw a^^ainst these dex)Osits, selling the
drafts to his clients, who, in t-irn, use them to pay
their creditors.
If one were to take gold to the bank in order to
get it transferred to another country, he would find
tJ'iat from each unit there would "be deductible a small
amount for shipping charges and insurance. The banker
wo lid undoubtedly offer to sell him a draft which
would cost hiia less than it wo ild cost him to ship his
1
gold.
2 Gold Points
The banker must, however, maice a careful study of
X)rices because his profit depends upon his selling his
drafts at a price above that which he paid to secure the
foreign deposits. Here, as in all business transactions,
profit is the spread cr margin between selling price and
cost. There are definite points between v/hich the price
can fluctuate. These points are called "gold points"
and represent the level at which it will no longer be a
1 XVII--f--May 3, 1931
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saving tc send drafts instead of actuall/ shipping the
gold. Prices vary with the sapi^ly and demand and when
the demand for exchange becomes greater than the supply
of exchange, the price rises and it becomes cheaper to
ship the gold. This may result in a flood of gold from
one coantry tc another as v/e shall see tcclc place in the
year 1931.
When there is a fixed relationship between the
val le of the currency units of countries, as there is
in the case of countries on the gold standard, the risk
due to exchange fluctuations is small. Then the market
conditions of a country will to a large extent determine
whether gold shall flc¥/ internationally. If prices go
-ip in one country more than in another, then gold will
be cheaper in the country which has the higher prices
and gold therefore, rather than other commodities, will
be shipped out. Gold will go where it can buy the most
1
or "gold seeks the market where its value is highest.*
If a country has a small amount of commodities
which it can export, small in comparison v/ith the amount
which it needs tc import, then there will be an in-
creasing demand for gold to export in order to equalize
or balance the accounts between it and coher nations.
ihis is necessary in order tc ma.^e oament for its
2
i.-aports.
1 I I- -page 139 2 I I- -page 143
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If a coantr/ continaes tc purchase more than it
sells, it may sec.ire loans. These loans will be in lieu
of im.nediate payment. The loans may be increased as
trade continaes between the two countries. Thus the
prosperity of a nation is not builded alone on the fact
that its exports exceed its i-iports. It is necessary
to examine the whole international financial statement
of a country to get a true picture of its standing in
its com^aercial relationships.
A coimtry needs enough gold to maintain adequate
reserves. It is quite rjossible for a country to iiave
gold which it cannot or dare not use. With an increase
in its reserves above the legal amount, additional cur-
rency co-ild be issued but the use of this reserve gold
for a large issue of paper currency would more than
liicely upset prices. If the gold is not used in this
way it tends to become sterilized, accumulating as a
crec^it resource but not used as such. The evils of ster
ilization will be discussed in a later chapter. Too
much gold then, as well as too little gold, can be
embarrassing to a country.
Relation Of The Movement Of Gold
To Interest Rates
Wlien business conditions are normal, gold cannot
continually leave one country. There comes a time when
trade readjusts itself so as to stop this outpouring of
gold. This readjustment will come about through a re-
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action upon the interest rates. In the coantry which
is losing the gold, funds will oecome scarce and inter-
est rates will rise. The country which receives the
gold will have its sujjly of f mds so increased that
rates will drop and hills of exchange, to transmit
funds, will he sent "by han.-cers from the country of the
lower interest rates and this will gradually bring about
a state of equilibrium in the excliange because gold will
then increase in the country of the higjier intereou
rates, decrease in the country of the lower rates, and
1
bring about a more nearly equal rate in each.
Interest rates have considerable to do in the deter-
mination as to whether or not the balance of iiiports
over exports shall be paid in gold. The balance will
very likely be invested in securities of the creditor
country if the interest rates are more favorable (theit
2
is higher) 'than the return on domestic securities.
This, then is another method by which the necessity for
the actual shipment of gold is avoided.
3
Method Of Handling- Gold
New York and London are the two most i.Tiportant
gold markets of the world; London because it is to that
city the output of the Transvaal is sent, and New York
because it J-iandle s such large quantities of gold, due to
the position of the 'Jnited States in international trade,
1 VIII--page 150 2 VII--page 382 3 XVII--f--
August 23, 1931
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Let as then exaraine the mechanism whereby the gold
is handled in New York,
When a shipment of gold arrives in New YoriC, the
customs men have about 10% of the boxes corded and
sealed, just as expire ss companies seal trunks a,nd boxes,
by clamping together the two ends of a wire cord. This
sealing is done before the shipment is transferred to
the banX. These boxes are examined by the customs men
at the Federal Reserve Bank and, if satisfactory, the
entire shipment is passed as being satisfactory.
From the point of view of the bank importing the
gold it is a bookkeeping operation. The gold itself
is transported in armored trucks to the Federal Reserve
3anK: from the boat. The bank importing the gold has
its agent present in the "cooperage" room in the base-
ment of the Reserve Banx and he watches it being un-
packed,
Upon the arrival of the boxes they are hastily
opened. The contents of e ach box is approximately
s^^25,000, contained in linen bags. The gold is dumped
ipon the floor and then checked by the Federal Reserve
officials, watched by the agent of the importing bank
and customs inspectors who are there to see that
nothing d.itiable (gold comes in free of d ity) is hidden
in the boxes.
If the shipment coming into the TTnited States is

made aiJ of American coins, it goes directly to the fed-
eral Reserve Banx and is credited to the account of the
imiDorting bank, the (^old being coorited and placed in the
Federal Reserve vaults . Deductions are made for coins
which are not up to the standard weight due to wear and
abrasion. If, however, the gold is in foreign coin or
bullion, the gold content must be determined and the
shipment is therefore taken to the Assay Office for
melting. The importing bank is immediately credited
with ^0% or more of the bullion val.ie, the balance
being credited when the shipment has been melted and
its value determined, The ''federal Reserve Bank will
not credit foreign coins and it is contrary to the
principles of the United States Treasury to accept
them. This is the reason the melting is necessary,
all the melted coin and bullion being converted into
bars.
Wlien a bank wishes to export gold, it calls up the
Reserve Bank and announces that it wo ild like a certain
amount prepared for shipment. The shipment may ta^^e the
form of coins or bars. If coins, the exact amount can
be shipped, but if bars, the average valiie of which is
,^7000, a little more or a little less may be sent, be-
cause of the lacaC of exact uniformity in the bars. Prom
$40,0o0 to $50,0v)0, in coins or bars, enclosed in bags,
are placed in the ^K:egs. Cords are then placed across
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the top and bet com of the kegs and at each intersection
of the cords a wax seal is placed. So cleverly done
is this sealinj^ that it would be very difficult to re-
move the gold without disturbin^i the seals.
The kegs are now ready and are taxen by elevator
to the street floor, loaded into armored tr icks and
transferred to the steamer. The gold is insured while
it is being thus transferred. There is lit tie danger,
however, of theft, because of the weight of the gold
which would make it very difficult for any one to ma^e
way with any great araount of it. #1,000,000 in gold
weighs more than a ton and a half.

CHAPTER I I I- -NATIONAL GOLD POLICIES
The United States
1 federal Reserve Policy
The banking }iistory of the last part of the 19th
centary and the beginning of the 20th centary shov/ed
the ban^icers of this country that reform was necessary.
It was in fact i.irjerative in the light of what was to
ha]3iDen--the World War, This country could not continue
to have panics and could not continue doing business in
the old way if it was to maintain its position.
There were many weaknesses in the old system. The
most important cf these being: the inelasticity of the
currency; lack of control of credit; (both of these
being especially important in tiiaes of changes in the
business cycle) the inefficient method of clearing
checks, checks being passed around in the mail, thus
maicing unavailable reserves, reserves that could be
counted but not used; and the decentralization of re-
serves. To iiaprove and eliminate these inadequate
qualities of the National Banking System, the Federal
Reserve Act was adopted on December 23, 1913, and this
marked the beginning of an era of important banking
reform.
This Act provided that every "f^ederal Reserve Bank
must maintain reserves in gold or lawful money of not
less than 35^ against its deposits, Kach member bank ^^^st

hold its legal reserve entirely on deposit with the
reserve "banks. Thas the le^^al reserves are credits on
the hocks of the reserve hamcs , The gold is kept in
the central banks, the title to it ifu.viug abo.it hy
means of bank debits and credits, and thus greater
utilization is provided for. The money .^ept in the.
vaults correspondent hanKs does not serve as part of
the legal reserve. The percentage of lae aber banks*
net deposits which must be held as credits with the
reserve banks is as follows:
Legal reoj^uirements. for reserves have been reduced to
a minimiun and grants of credit zo tne b ismess public
have been greatly ia.ti oiplied. After the amendinent of
June 21, 1917, gold deposited with the Agent as security
for the reserve notes could be counted as a part of the
1
Reserve Bank's A0% gold reserve for notes.
1 Federal Reserve notes are issues of the reserve
banks upon the security of comiaercial paper and
each note bears the number of the district in which
it is issued. Any reserve bank can make application
to the Federal Reserve Agent for the amount of notes
it wishes, sending with the application collateral
equal to the amount of notes applied for. Section
16 states that
For Demand
ve posits
For Time
De posits
BanKs in central reserve cities
BanKs in reserve cities
Ban^s in all otner cities
13
10
7
3
3
3
the collateral security thus offered shall be
notes, drafts, bills of exchange, or acceptances
(continued on next page)
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One of the faults of the old bamcing system was
the inelasticity of the currency. Under the federal
Reserve System elasticity of the currency is x^rovided
for in the method by which meriber banks can borrow
from their reserve bank. Loans can be made on ccllat-
1
eral or by the process of rediscounting.
The first tyje, collateral loans, was much in use
during the period of the Liberty Bond flotations. The
loan is made by the reserve banks upon the tiiscounting
of collateral notes of member banks. These notes must
run for periods of not mere than 15 days, the collateral
being '''s.ich notes, drafts, bills of exchan^^e, cr bankers*
acceptances as are eligible for rediscount or for pur-
chase by federal reserve banks" and bonds or notes of
the United States rrcvernmei t.
1 IV-A--page 63
acquired under the provisions of section thir-
teen of this Act, or bills of excha,nge indorsed
by a member bank of any "R'ederal reserve district
and purchased under the provisions of section
fourteen of this Act, or bankers* accex)ta,nces
purchcised under the provisions of said section
fourteen, or gold or gold certificates.
Additional security can be required. These notes are
receivable by all members and reserve banks, are re-
ceivable for taxes, are obligations of the United
States, but are not legal tender for private payments
and may not be counted as xmrt of the legal reserve
of a member bank. Reserve Banks must also maintain
a 40% gold reserve be?iind tliese notes. If the re-
serve falls below A0% a penalty in the form of a grad-
uated tax is pixid by the Reserve Bank. These notes
are issued to member banks through the process of re-
discount.
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The second t/pe, that of rediscoant ing, is bound
by certain r egulati ens as to the paper eligible for re-
discoant. This paper must mature within 90 days, ex-
cept bills or notes drawn for agricultural purposes or
based on live stock, when the ti.ae limit may be up to
six months. The p^ er must be (l) 'notes, drafts, or
bills of exchange, bearing the endorsement cf the member
bank and ^arising out of actual commercia.1 transactions,*
that is, issued or drawn *for agricultural, industrial,
or comjnercial purposes, or the proceeds of which have
been used for such purposes;* and (2) notes, drafts and
bills of exchange bearing the endorsement of a member
bank and issued or drawn for the purpose of carrying or
trading in * bonds and notes of the Government of the
1
United States. '
*
So, if a member bank, located, let us say, in the
country, is in danger of having its reserve for demand
deposits fall below 7^, it may take eligible paper to
its reserve bank and I'lave it rediscounted. If it takes
^20,000 of this paper and rediscounts it at 4^% for 60
days, the proceeds would be 119,850, which would repre-
sent 7% of its legal reserve for ^283,572 of demand
deposits. Thus its Tending power would be greatly in-
creased. If the member bank does not need the entire
proceeds of the rediscounted paper to maintain its 7%
1 IV-A--page 64
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reserve v/ith the federal reserve bank, the excess
1
eimount could be taken in cash.
In order to facilitate the clearing of checks
each federal reserve bank has been given the power
to act as a clearing house for meiaber banks and for
certain other banks, not meabers, who qualify under
the ariendnent of Jane 21, 1917. The federal reserve
bank receives at par ••cliecks drawn on all member ban^cs
and on all non-monber banxs which agree to remit at
par through the federal reserve bank of their district."
Each federal reserve bank renders clearing and collec-
tion services for member and non-member banks in the
case of checks from districts other than its ovm. This
is in addition to its local services. The cost of
these services is borne by the federal reserve banks.
The checks are sent along the most direct routes, maxing
2
collections much quicker than they ever were before.
The foregoing statements will give some idea as
to the direction in v/hich the efforts of the country
were oent to bring about the necessary reform in our
ban^cing system.
1 IV-A--page 63
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The Federal Reserve Act, beirit^ adopted at the end
of 1:^13, bro ight the l^'edera.l Reserve System into oioer-
ation J Ast about the tirae the World War started and
conditions throa^^hoat the v/orld were bein^ revolution-
ized. One of the first problems of the IS'ederal Reserve
Board was to deal with the lar^e imfjorts of s^^^ y^hich
were flowing to this country from Europe. From the
bej^innin^;^ of the War to the end of 1916 about one
thousand two hundred millions of dollars were adued to
our iiold stocics'^ or from the end of IToveraoer, 1.^14, to
the end of March, 1^17, the net amount of iiapcrts of
^old were one thousand one /lundred eighty-nine millions
of dollars, seven hundred ten millions of it coming
into the liands of reserve banKs or agents, the differ-
ence going to private banKs, into circulation, etc^
Obviously the banKs were not ir epared to handle this
unforeseen situation reqiiiring the assimilation of so
much gold. It was hoped that the acciuaulating gold re-
serves would in some way be prevented from being used as
the basis of an expansion of credit which would not be
beneficial to the country.
When such large amounts of gold were entering the
United States the Federal Reserve Banks ''started the
policy of issuing Federal Reserve notes in exchange for
gold, and the Federal Reserve note, up to the time of
1 XVI- -page 204 2 XVI- -page 208 3 See foot-
note, page 26

oar entry into the War in 1^17, was in effect a gold
certificate. The object soutiht in this policy, es-
pecially in view of the extraordinary character of the
shiftir^ of the world's stocK of monetciry gold then in
pro^^ress as an incident of the War, was to treat the
reserve ban^s as repositories of gold against the day
when it seemed reasonable to expect that the largest
portion of our new acciaisi tions of gold would flow bacic
to Europe, and was also in furtherance of the early
1
credit policy of the Board." This aided in preventing
the gold from acc>umulating in member ban>cs and thus
prevented it from being used for unwise creait expan-
sion.
When the United States entered the War, the Federal
Reserve t^oard feared that the exodus of gold exports
would start, so a gold export committee was appointed
to license exfjorts in order to retain all the gold
possible in this country. In 1:919, however, this plan
was abandoned and gold was allowed to flow freely, al-
though since^ the movement has been constantly in our
favor. Gold has been accumulating in the United States.
The evils attendant upon tii is accumulation of the gold
of the world were given by H. Parser Willis in the He-
port of the Comraission of G-old and Silver Inquiry in
1 XVI- -page 207
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the United States Senate in 1925 as being"""
(1) Inflation of prices tlirough the pro-
vision of an undaly large bank-credit
base
.
Inflation of prices and credit gen-
erally, through the saturation of the
currency with gold, at the same ti:ne
that the reserve banking raechanisra
lost control of the money situation
by the all but complete liquidation
of rediscounts which had been pre-
viously raade with it,
Es tablishaent of business and bank-
ing conditions ^lich would lead to
serious s offering when the outward
movement of gold should set in,
owing to reaction from a one-sided
exchange balance,
Disturbctnce of the rediscount rate,
first, through tmdue tendencies to
lower it as a result of high re-
serve ratios, and then probably
through undue tendency to advance
it, as a result of loss of gold
and a lowering of the ratio.
The measures taken to remedy these evils have been
for the most part ineffectual. Raising the rediscount
rate was one method of combating inflat.ion; the proposed
"super- re serve* or segregation of a large part of the
gold reserves so that, by changing the method of com-
puting the reserve ratio, the gold could be used only
as a reserve against deposits; the advocating of putting
into circulation as much gold as possible; these were
some of the raeas Ares which were resorted to.^
(2)
(3)
(4)
1 XVI- -page 26 2 XVI--page 26
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Z Gold Settlement "F'und
The Gold Clearance Fund, or the Gold Settlement
Fund as it is commonly called, was established by the
Federal Reserve Board to facilitate the clearing of
checks between Federc*,l Reserve districts. It is a
fund made up of contributions of ^pl,vOOO,000 in gold
or gold certificates from each Federal Reserve Bamc,
administered by the Federal Reserve Board and depos-
ited in the United States Treasury or in the nearest
subtreasury. By a system of debits and. credits which
offset one another, checks are cleared through this
fund. At ten o'clock, eastern standard time, each
morning, the Federal Reserve Banks telegraph to the
Federal Reserve Board informing the Board of the ainount
of the checks credited to other Reserve BctriKS daring
the preceding day. Then the Federal Reserve Board, on
tnia basis, increases or decreases the account of each
Reserve Bank in the Gold Settlement Fund. Thus, if the
Federal Reserve of ITew Yotk cleared .^500,000 worth of
checks of other Reserve Banks and all the other Reserve
Banks cleared
-5450,000 worth of checks for the Xew York
Reserve Bank, then the !Tew York Reserve Banlc would have
•^50,000 added to its balance in the Gold Settlement
-lowed to drop below
.l,.oo.OOO. If the day's trans-
1 Vlll-.pii^e 588
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actions v/ould reduce the "bcilance below this figure,
the 15"ederHl Reserve BanK: must iirunediately send more
gold tc the TreHSury. The balance of gold v/hich
each 7ederctl Reserve 3an^ has to its credit in this
fund is counted as part of its legal reserve. This
fund has added much to the facility of baniviing oper-
ations due to the fact tliat very little money has to
be shipped from one part of the country to another
and this has, consequently, made more money available
for use
.
The Gold Settlement Fund system has practically
eliminated the need of shipping money between federal
reserve ban^cs. These banxs are now able tc telegraph
funds anywhere in the United States for tiieir member
ban-i^s and do so without charge.
A member ban^ ma/ draw snecial drafts upon its
reserve ban^: for amounts up to |!5, -00. These are re-
ceivable and may be put tc imriediate use at any other
federal reserve bank. By means of these federal re-
serve exchange drafts and the telegraphic system of
transmitting funds, there is no longer a large amount
of floating money, the actual exchange of gold being
very small. This has res ilted in considerable savings
for banks because they no longer need to keep deposits
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in corres,)ondent banks to enable them to collect
their checks. Thus their funds can be used much more
profitably.
Great '-^rita-in
1 The Bank of Enf^;land
In the early part of the seventeenth century the
merchants of London were in the habit of storing their
gold in the Tower of London to be safeguarded by the
protection furnished by the Government, Charles I,
however, in 1540, needing money to pay his army,
seized some 1.130,000 of this gold. This led the mer-
chants to the decision to seek a safer place for their
gold. They then pit it in the hands of trusted gold-
siiiths and t/ius came about the banking system of Eng-
1
land.
The goldsmiths tdok money on deposit, receipts be-
ing given for these deposits, and they in turn lent the
gold to those desiring to borrow. It was^. not long be-
fore the receipts for the gold der)osits began to circu-
late and so we have the beginning of the banknote system.
Before very long those v/ho had gold on deposit formed the
1 XV- -page 1144
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habit of drawing checks on the goldsmiths. The gold-
smiths, however, were forced to lend gold to Lhe Gov-
erniaent and when the Governiaent released to rex^a/ them,
1
it meant tneir ruination.
The Bank of England, tiie oldest central bank in
the world, Wc.s t.xe outcome, it being estaolislied in
1694. ihe iSanK of England is a private institution but
it operates as a public institution. It acts in the
lollowmg capacities:
"1. iictiiacer to the British Government
*2, Banker to the joint stocx and private bani<:s
"3. (a) Sole possessor of the right to isRue
notes which are .legal tender in England;
(b) sole possessor, eiaong joint stock banxs
v/ith an office in London, of tne right to
issue notes at all
"4. Provider of emergency currency
"5. Keeper of the gold reserve for British
banking
*6
, Keeper of the gold reserve which is most
readily availe.ble for the purposes of
international banking,**
It developed that, in its position as banker to the
joint stock and private banks and its relation to the
Government, the Bank of England was in so impregnable a
position that deposits in it came to be considered as
good as gold, l^rom the imnner of treating these bal-
ances in the statements of the individual banks, no
1 XV- -page 1144 2 XVI- -page 567
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difference could be detected betv^een actual c;old hold-
in^^s and the balance in the coffers of the Bank of
En^iland.
As the banker to the joint stock and x^rivate
banks, the Baa^: of En^^land had to be resiDonsible for
the maintenance of the gold reserve for the English
banks and had to be ready at all times to meet any
draft on London that any one might wi^h to convert
into gold. The gold held as a reserve by the Bank of
England amounted to about 5;5 1/3^ of the total balances
of the individual banits."*" In the pyramiding of credit
then, considering the fact that tiiese balances were
considered as cash by the individual banKs and used as
credit from five to fifty times their amount, there htis
been criticism of too great an economy of gold. How-
ever, with the growth of England into a leader in inter
national trade, it became a well-knov/n fact that London
was always ready to pay gold upon demand. This led to
the consideration of London as the financial center of
the world.
?. Prior To The War
Prior to the World War, the Banx of England had
tliree embarrassing situations due to financial crises.*^
The first was in 1847 when there were large withdrawals
of gold due to large i.aports of wheat brought about by
1 XVI--page 572 2 XV--page 1158
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a bad season and to undue speculation in domestic rail-
road securities. The <^o Id reserves of the BanA: of Eng-
land dropped to a point which was considered serious
and it was necessary for the G-overnraent to step in.
The Government came to the aid of the Bank of England
by telling it that "if notes were issued wit?iout gold
backing in excess of the limit authorized by the Act of
1844, it would propose to Parliament a Bill of Indemnity
in respect of the oreach of the Act, it being stipulated
that the minimum rate for loans and discounts should be
Q%, The Bank was thus at liberty to continue to advance
to the market by adding to its fiduciary note issue,**
In 1357, due to over-expansion of credit, extension
of foreign trade in a marj<:et which was not sound, and a
financial crisis in the United States which resulted in
many English failures, it was necessary to resort to the
sarae measures as in 1847. But at this time the Bank of
England had actually to increase its issue of notes,
while in 1847 the mere fact that the Bank could, if it
wished, issue more notes, was all that was needed to re-
lieve the situation.
Again in 1866, a li.<:e situation arose, tliis tiae
brought about by the unsound development of baniving
companies and tlie resulting fa-ilure of one of the most
influential financial houses. ITo excess notes, hov/ever,
1 XV--page 1159 2 XV-.page 1159 3 XV--page 1159
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were iasaed.
All of these crises came aboat frora the inelastic-
it/ of the ciirrency, which has since been corrected by
the development of the checic as a credit instruiaent,
5 Period Of The War
During the x^eriod of the War, there was a movement
tov/ard amalgamation of ban^s. The small ban-<s became
absorbed by the larger banx:s and the large joint stock
1
banjis amalgaraated. The approaching period of recon-
striction, with the necessity for concerted action, was
a strong motive, and once the movement had started, tne
spirit of rivalry to exceed the size of other leading
banks carried it on,
Great Britain's financial problems just after the
outbreak of the World War were as follows:''
*1. The shcc^ to confidence made it prob-
able that there would be a run on the
banks which v/ould render the oijnount
of legal tender money inadequate to
meet the demands for it,
'*2. Owing to the disturbance to the foreign
exchanj,es and the severance of diplo-
matic relationships, the foreign
debtors of the London accepting nouses
(i.e., the parties on whose behalf
bills had been accepted in London)
were unable to remit funds to London
to meet the bills at maturity, with
the result that the accepting houses
found the greatest difficulty in
meeting their obligations.
1 XV- -page 1163 2 XV- -page 1199
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••3. The inability of t?ie acceptors of
bills imraediately and fally to dis-
charge their liabilities made it
iipossible for the bill brcjcers to
obtain payment of the bills held at
matirity. At the saiae time, the
baUixs were calling in their loans
to the market in order to strengthen
their cash positions. As a resalt
of tnis combination of circiimstances
,
the discount market was on the verge
of collar)se,
'*4. On the StocK Exchange, a large busi-
ness in foreign securities had been
done for foreign clients, who on bal-
ance owed the ma.rk.et considerable
Slims. The dislocation of the foreign
exchanges made it impossible for these
foreign debtors to remit. Added to
this, there was a general depreciation
of all types of sectrity, with the
possibility that the bcunKs woald re-
fuse to renew their loans to the
Stoc : Excriange as they fell due for
repayment, and would certainly reduce
tne amo.mts in order to keep intact
the .us ial margin betv/een the value of
the security and the amount of money
advanced, 'Inder these conditions,
business could not be carried on in
the absence of emergency measures."
On July 30, 1^14,"^ the London Stock Exchange,
following the example set by many of the exchanges on
the continent, closed. London took advantage of her
position as a creditor and started to call in credit,
causing a demand for sterling bills by foreign debtors.
It was impossible to remit gold because of the war sit-
uation and the value of sterling exchange rose in all
countries except "France, the banks of which had large
deposits in the Bamc of England. The Bank rate reached
1 XV--page 1201

10%. Gold, however, could not flov/ and a moratorium
for the .oa/ment of bills of exchantje was declared and
1
extended to ITovember.
Before the War, Banic of England notes had to be
T
<^
backed by gold to their fill value. Therefore, to
increase the note issue, gold wo Aid have to be im-
ported but war conditions made this i:apossible. T'ear
of a run on the ban.cs brought about the Currency and
3
Bank Xotes Act of August 6, 1914. This ;)rovided for
the issue of notes for lal and 10 s. to be legal tender
of the "^Tnited Kingdom and convertible into gold coin
at tile Bank of England. '•The notes, by the joint
operation of the Act and a Treasury Minute of the saiie
date, were to be issued through the Banx<: of England to
ban^cers as and when required up to a limit not exceeding,
in the case of any banji, 20% of its liabilities on depos-
it and current account, and were to be treated as an ad-
vance by the Treasury to the bank concerned, bearing
interest at Bank rate, and secured by a floating charge
on the assets of each bamc tip to the amount of notes
issued to it. The advances could be repaid at any time,
and suras received in repayment were to be applied by the
Banic of England in cancelling currency notes returned
4
from circulation.
It was felt that the gold of the country should be
1 XV- -page 1202 2 XV- -page 1204 3 XV- -page
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concentrated in the hands of the banks and a mobili-
zation of jold was brout^ht aboat without special leg-
islation. A concentrated gold reserve v/as desirous
because of the fact that the Crovern^ient might need it
and the effect of having all the gold in one place
was more potent than if it were scattered throughout
the country.
During the early part of the War, a certrj,in amc mt
of the gold was eariaar.ied for a reserve for currency
note issues. After the War, this reserve was supple-
mented and later s iperseded by 3an^ notes. The curren-
cy notes in excess of the earmari^ed gold and Bank notes
represented a Government loan because the Government
borrowed the balance remaining and substituted its own
securities. This led to inflation and the abandon-aent
of the gold standard on the part of Great Britain. This
is true, even though there was no change in the Banking
Act, which provided for the conversion of currency notes
into gold. There was no movement of gold because of the
cost of export. (See discussion of gold points, page 17)
The Bank of England thus lost its predominant position
in the financial market of the world, because there was
no longer a free gold market and a definite connection
between the araount of gold and the iimount of currency in
1 X^/--page 1203
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CJreat Britain, These are two essential qualities if
a nation is to be on the gold standard,
4 Since The War
At the close of the War, Great .Britain was thus
confronted with a seriois "banicing problein. In 1313, the
Cunliffe Committee was aj^jointed to investigate the sit-
uation and, if j_)ossiDle, offer a plctn which would solve
the jrohlsm and restore to Great Britain the ^^old stand-
ard. Tne Committee, in its reports, made the followin^^
1
statements:
•(a) The cessation of Governraent borrow-
ing as soon as possible after the
war, and the provibion of a singeing
fund for the reduction of the
national debt, more especiall/ the
floating debt.
'•(b) The pre-war machinery which operated
to check a foreign drain of gold and
the speculative expansion of credit--
namel/ tjie effective raising of i3ank
rate--must be restored to wording
order.
'•(c) The fiduciary issue of notes should
as soon as practicable be again lim-
ited by lav/, and the present arrange-
ments under v/hich the deposits of the
BanK of England could oe exchanged
for legal currency without affecting
the reserve of the Banking Depart-
I'lent should be terminated at tiie
earliest possible moment. The note
issue should ulti.iately be placed
entirely in the hands of the .Bank of
England."
T}ie following recomiiendations were also iriade by the Com-
mittee : ^
1 XV--x)age 1216 2 XV- -page l;^16
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'•(l) Althoui^h Bank of England and cur-
rency notes shoald be convertible
into f^old on demand, it was not
neceBsar/ or desirable ti-iat tiiere
siioald be an/ earl/ resiirajtion of
the internal circulation of gold
coin.
••(2) Wnile the import of gold should be
free from all r estric ticns , it was
convenient that the Bank of Eng-
land should have cognizance of all
gold exports, and the export of
gold sho lid therefore be subject
to the Coiidition that such gold
should be obtained f rom the Bank
of England for the purpose.
"(3) The go td reserves of the country
sho ild be held by one central in-
stitution, and all ban-cs should
transfer any gold then held by
them to the Bank of England.**
The Committee also offered the recomiaendation that the
central gold reserve should be set at a minimum of
Jil50,000,000 and that notes should not be issued and
circulated beyond the point at which this reserve
could be maintained. It was, of course, going to be
necessary to build up this reserve. The gold reserves
before the War were estimateu to be about $38,500,000
in the Bank of England and £123,000,000 in other banks
and in the possession of individuals.^ This centrali-
zation of a 3^150,000,000 reserve was then quite possi-
ble of realization. The Com_iittee further recomtaended
that '*lTntil this ainount has been reached and maintained
1 XVI --page 625
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concurrently with a satisfactory foreign exchange
position for at least a /ear, the policy of cautious-
ly redacint^ the uncovered note issue should be fol-
lowed. When reductions have been effected, the
actual roaximum fiduciary circulation in any year
sho ild become the legal maxiniiin for the following
year, subject only to the emergency arrangements pre-
viously recommended.*
3y 1921, there were d efinite signs of improve-
ment in the value of the pound sterling. A fluctuat-
ing currency or a currency of uncertain value is
detrimental to the foreign trade of 3.ny country and
Great Britain realized this. Great Britain hesitated
to return too qiiickly to the gold standard because of
fear of deflation and contraction in her currency and
her credit. Also there was considerable prejudice
against and opposition to devaluation, a solution to
which she might have reverted.
By January, 1925," a gold reserve of £155,000,000,
equal to about AOfo of the x)aper money in circulation,
was in the Banj^ of England. On the 23th of April,
1925, the return of Gre^t Britain to the gold standard
was announced by the Chancellor of the Exchequer and
the Gold Standcxrd Act of 1925 was enacted. According
to this Act, ''The Bank of England is obliged to buy
1 XVI- -page 630 2 XVI.-page 638 3 XV- -page
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all i^old bullion offered to it at the price of
is. 17. 9. per sta.ndard ounce (i.e., Il/I2ths fine),
the same price as prevailed before the war, and to
pay out in the form of bars containing approximately
400 ounces of fine ^old in exchanti'e for all forms of
legal tender money (i.e., Bank of England notes, cur-
rency notes, and gold coin) at the rate of SiS.l?. 104-
.
per standard ounce (i.e., 3,4. 4. llf. per fine ounce).
The recipient of the gold bars is of course free to
export them or otherwise deal with thera as he wishes,"
However, only the Bank of England can demand that gold
bullion be made into coin. The gold reserves of Great
Britain were now centralized in the 3ank of England.
Prom 1925 until 1931 Great Britain remained apon
the gold standard. The causes leading to a second
abandonraent of the gold standard in 1931 will be dis-
cussed in a later chapter. (Chapter IX)
1 XV- -page 1221
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?rance
The French monetary system was first based upon
free coina^ie of both j^o.ld and silver. The standard
coins, however, were of silver, the gold coins being
merely stamped with their wei^^iht, to satisfy the pub-
lic, the law of i<larch P.'i)
,
1804, put, gold on the same
basis as silver and both gold and silver v/ere declared
to have fall legal tender value. rhus bimetallism was
established and the ratio of 1 to 15^ 'oet^veen ^old and
silver was set up. In the section of this treatise
devoted t,o biiue Lctllism we have seen the aifi iculties to
be encountered witii the Ciianging values of the two
metals. France was not immune to these difficulties
and bi2iietallism was abandoned, if not entirely, at
least to the extent of establishing gold as the stand-
ard, although certain silver coins could still be used
as full legal tender^ Thus, theoretically, France
operates on a bimetallic system, but practically on a
gold basis.
The central French bank is cal led the Bank of
France. It is privately owned but closely supervised
by the Government. It has the exclusive authority to
issue the fiduciary currency of the nation. The amount
of notes it can have in circulation is set by law but
the amount actually circulating depends upon business
1 XV- -page 525
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1
conditions
,
The Ban^.c of France is not r equired b/ law to have
a fixed specie r eserve . The raanat;einent deteriaines the
relation of the notes and deposits to the reserve.
The roanae^ement has, however, been conservative and for
about four decades before the World War maintained re-
serves a ooat equal to the notes in circulation. The
reserve was in both gold and silver, because the 3anic
could redeem its notes with either gold or silver.
During the War, r eueraption of the notes was sus-
pended. To finance the G-overnment * s operations there
was a period of inflation. Thus after the close of the
War it was necessary for !Prance to embark upon some
monetary reforms, for the monetary problems of the Gov-
ernment were serious. With inflation there had devel-
oped an unbalanced budget. This had to be corrected
if conditions were to be stabilized. Also it was nec-
essary to do away with all the irredeemable notes which
were outstanding. When, at the outbreak of the War,
the bank notes were declared to be inconvertible, gold
disappeared from circulation, and later silver also.
Silver was worth more melted down than it was in coin
fo-m. All the gold that it possibly could, the Govern-
ment brought into the Bank of France, and, in making
this effort, prohibited gold exports. The franc not
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only fluctuated in value but it was greatly depreciated
in Value, To restore the franc to its pre-war value
was obviovisly impossible, if the entire fr; ^nev/crk of
the nation was not to be sJiaken and seriously dis-
turbed. A return to the j^old standard was, however,
deemed advisable. The gold reserves in the Banx of
1
France were larger than before the War.
In June, 1928, the French Parliairaent passed a
law which contc^ined the following features: "The re-
turn to the gold standard, with the temporary authority
in the 3ank to refuse to redeem its notes, excex:)t in
gold 'agots up to a certain weight (namely, 215,000
francs or a little more than 12 kilograms of fine gold),
the establishment of the franc at its then existing value,
the termination of the li.nits fixed by law for the issue
of notes and the establishment of a definite relation-
ship between the reserve and the demand obligations of
the Bank of France, as well as, last of all, the settle-
ment of its loans to the Crovernment , So the new mone-
tary unit is defined in the law as '*The franc, the
French monetary unit, consists of 65.5 milligrammes of
gold, 900/1000 fine.***^ This is between one-fourth and
one -fifth of its pre-war value.
In the case of a reform of any Kind there is al-
ways critisra and opposition and 'H'rance did not escape.
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There were iia-n/ who thought that the franc she aid not
have been stabilized at the lov/ point to which it had
dropped, but felt that it should have been revalorized.
Revalorization, hov/ever, would have had sad effects
upon the financial mechanism of the country. Froia the
point of view of France, then, this new stabilized
value was a hax)py solution.
The law of 1923 made the further provisions that
'•The Bank of France is held responsible
for the x)ayment of its notes in gold to
bearer on demand."
'•In disc>iarging this obligation, the
Bank of France has the right to redeem
its notes in gold coins having the legal
tender pov/er or in gold bars at the rate
of 65.5 milligrammes, 900/1000 fine,"
'•It has the right to make these redemptions
at the head office alone and in such min-
imum amounts as agreed upon between the
Minister
-.of Finance and the Bank of
France
.
And so we have France once more back on the gold
standard. Her gold reserves increased steadily until
she is now second only to the United States in her
total gold holdings.
1 XV- -page 531
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Oemany
Bari/cing history in Germany can be said to have
started about the year 134B. In 1348, the first Ger-
raan joint stock bank was organized in the city of
1
Cologne. A few years later, in 1357, the German
Zollverein, or federation of states, made a treaty
with Austria. This treaty marked the adoption of a
single silver standard, but provided that the parties
to the treaty could coin gold crowns and half crowns,
which would circulate at their market valae but which
could not be used as legal tender.
Silver did not long remain the standard. There
was no iiniform system of coins and due to the fact
that most of the gold was finding its way into Prance,
the market ratio in i^rance being 15.27 and the legal
ratio 15.5, Germany was left with a conglomerate col-
lection of coins which were very inconvenient to handle.
There was then much agitation in favor of the adoption
of the gold standard and the first gold standard bill
4
was passed in 1371, This law provided for the discon-
tinuance of the general coinage of silver and the be-
ginning of the coining of ten and twenty-mark pieces
to be made of gold. Gold coins were to be used with-
out limit as full legal tender.
With the establishing of the Reichsbank by a law
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of 1874''" the gold standard became a definite force in
the financiB.1 history of Germany. 'vThile the law (of
July 9, 1873) provided that t?ie silver tulers were to
have t'lill le^al tender to twenty marks, there was
only a very limited n.iraber of them left in circulation
and they, in the country of Germany, can be compared
to the silver dollar of the United States. In 1900
there were ctiaendments to this law which removed this
situation and left Germany on a true j^old standard.
The new Reichsbank was required to exchant<,e its notes
for gold bullion and also to redeem its notes upon de-
mand in gold coin. The notes of the Reichsbank were
to be considered legal tender.
Then came the War* At the ti ae of the outbreak of
the War in 1914, Germany's financial condition was un-
assailable. In August of that year, however, Germany
suspended the redemption in gold of the ReichsbanK*s
notes. By playing upon the rjatriotism of the r^eople
("•gold I gave for iron") the Reichsbank attempted to
build up its gold reserves. It endeavored to withdraw
gold coins from circulation and by so doing was almost
able to double its gold reserve. The Germans were quite
canny in their handling of their available gold. They
allowed to pass out of the coiintry just as little as
they possibly could. in payment of foreign purchases
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made dtiring the War, estimated at about 15,000,000,000
gold marks, only 1,000.000,000 d;old marks were sent.
The remaining 14,000,000,000 debt was financed by
secaritios of other coantries, the sale of domestic
securities, exchange credits, and last, but amounting
to the largest sum, the sale of mark notes abroad.
It is questionable whether or not Oermany was wise in
her action to prevent gold f rora leaving the country
but it was certainly effective in bringing about a
critical financial condition in Europe.
It did not take long after the beginning of the
War for inflation to set in, although during the
period of the War Germany v/as able quite effectively
to conceal the seriousness of the situation. The print-
ing presses were set to work. ITew currency for Gov-
ernment use was created, Not only was there a great
increase in paper marks but the war loans made by the
State had to be considered as good security for ad-
vances and thus came a pyramiding of loans. The mark
dropped to less than 1/7000 of its pre-war exchange
2
value
,
When the Republic was set ip in Germany it took
over the Reichsbank. There had previously been pri-
vate s hareholders
,
aJ.though managed by a Chancellor
and subordinate to him there was a Board appointed by
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the Emperor and the Federal Council, The Chancellor
1
was chairman of the Federal Council,
The BariK. seemed ajpathetic in its control or lack
of control cf the financial situation after the V/ar,
out in 152.^, it seemed to rouse itself. The invasion
of the Rahr was the imraediate cause of the awakening
of the 3ank to its responsibilities. The mariC, wixich
at par, is equivalent to about 24/ or approximately
•
)
four to a dollar, was quoted, in the si;mraer of 1922,
at approximately 2000 for a dollar. Early in 1923,
they were quoted at 21,000 for a dollar and by the end
of July, 1,100,000 marks were offered for a dollar,
and by the close of the year, 4,200,000,000 for a
dollar, Finances were i adeed d emoralized. The Reichs-
bank in its futile attempts toward some Kind of sta-
bilization reached the end of its resources.
Thus, indeed, it can be seen that the printing
presses had been busy. It was quite obvious what the
result had to be. The paper mark had to be given up.
To expresfs it mildly, conditions in Germany were
chaotic. It took rolls and rolls of money to buy
anything. Prices were fantastic. Drastic action was
necessary. The Government repudiated this comic-
opera paper money and floated a new kind of currency
in the form of dollar treasury notes which were non-
1 XV- -page 662 2 XV--rjage 665

-51-
interest bearing and issued in denominations equiva-
lent to $1 for 4.2 gold marks, t?Z for 8.4 gold marks,
and for 21 gold marks.
In October, 1923, the rentenmark, issued by the
German Rentenbank*^ came into existence. This was the
beginning of the new monetary system of Germany. The
value of the rentemaariC was set at one trillion paper
o
mar-Ks or one gold mark soon after its issue. Due to
the recognition of foreign countries of the necessity
for staoilization in the German monetary system, and
due to the previous issue of the dollar treasury bills
by the Government, it became psychologically easy and
therefore actually not too difficult, to stabilize the
mark at its old pre-war value.
It 1924, a new Reichsbank law was passed. The
Bank }ias "been granted the right to issue notes for a
period of fifty years and these notes are considered
to be legal tender. There is no limit to the total
amount that can be circulated provided the circulating
notes are secured by at least 40/^ in gold and foreign
bills, three-fourths of which must be in gold, and
the remaining can consist of coioraercial bills and
checks which must conform to certain standards of
4
eligibility as set by definite provision. The
Reichsbank must convert, upon demand, ban^ notes into
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gold coins or ^old bars or in foreign bills at
the
rate of exchange for the day.
Tte Cxerman Gold Discoant Bank was established in
March of irPA^ to prevent the disintegration of Ger-
man industry which was i uainent because of the re-
strictions on the issuing of credits by the Reichs-
bank. This new bank was created to supplement the
Rentenbank^ by serving as a central bank for foreign
transactions. The German Gold Discount Bank was
allowed to issue notes expressed in terms of English
pounds to circulate in foreign countries only. The
security behind the notes was set at bO% gold and
foreign gold currencies and bO% in ^ills and checks
drawn in foreign currencies. The pound sterling and
dollar exchanges were the only ones actually accept-
able. The note isoue was limited to 3,5,000,000.
The new Reichsbank was established in August of
1924 and it soon acquired ownership of the Gold Dis-
count Bank. With the strengthening of Germany's
monetary system, the necessity for the functioning of
the Gold Discount Bank in foreign trade o ecame less
iaportant and it then t irned its resources toward the
agric iltural side of Germany's finances, becoming
domestic in its activities.
It is of interest to note a comp. risen of the
1 AV--page 6 70 ;5 XV- -page 6 71
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volume of paper mariis in circalation in December,
1913, ana jNovember, 19i^3, and the ^^old holding in marges
and uhe ec^uivalent in united n testes dollars."^
Bquivalent
Note of Note Gold
Date Circulation CircLilation Holdings
Marks in U, S. Marks
i»ollars
Dec. 1913 2,503,000,000 f.617 , 240 , 000 1,266,187,000
Nov. 1923 400,267,640,291, 60,040,146 467,000,000
750,000,000
An interesting feature of the inflation period was
the .ise of what was knc^vn as gold balance sheets. The
instability of the currency led to the necessity of de-
termining some means whereby one could judge the actual
condition of business. All inventories and balances
were stated in terms of gold raarics, regardless of the
paper mark records. These balance sheets can be ased
in determining how great the suffering and losses were
in the financial, economic and industrial life of post-
war Germany.
In considering the systems used by France and
Germany for the issuing of notes, we see two methods of
2
regulation. In the Gerinan system the principle of a
fixed ratio is adhered to. That is to say, the notes
issaed must be sec ired by a fixed proportion of gold
and securities, t?ie proportion being approximcitely one-
thirl gold and tv/o- thirds securities, with the pro-
vision that this proportion may be exceeded upon the
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payraent to the Governiaent of a tax of 5^ of the excess
notes
.
In the case of France, the ^^rinciple of raaximura
issue was practiced. This means that while the issue
of notes is li.iiited, there is no definite, set aiaount
of t^old necessary to be held in reserve. This re-
quires strict ^overmiental banking sux^ervision.
Another method would be to go to the other ex-
treme and require a reserve equal to the amount of the
note issue, which was the situation in the United
States prior to the installation of the Federal Reserve
System.
To leave Germany without some discussion of the
sub^ ct of reparations in the li^ht of her financial
organization would be c^uite amiss. We will, liowever,
leave it .intil a later chapter, when it will be discussed
in connection with the moratorium of 1921.
Crcld "Rlxclusion Policy Of Scandinavian Countries
The policy of the exclusion of c;oT-<i which Sweden
put into effect on February 3, 1916, is an interesting
phase m the history of gold. The Riksbank, in 1914,
suspended the payment of g old for the redemption of its
notes. G-old, however, continued to flow into Sweden
and, in January, 1916, gold redemption was resumed.
Even 80, the gold continued to increase. The Riksbanic
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had to "buy all gold offered to it and, in doing so,
increased the circulation of its notes which it issued
in payment of the ^old. Thus the note issue becarae
larger than there was an/ call for it to tae and, to
protect herself economically from the danger of the
possibility and probability of a drop in the value of
gold, the Banic Act of 1916 was passed which permitted
the RiKsbanlc to refuse to buy gold bullion or to give
gold coins in exchange for the' bullion. This was an
extraordinary situati on and one which led to much dis-
cussion throughout the financial circles of the world.
This gold-exclusion policy meant thttt Sweden aban-
doned the gold standard. She iiad ^jernitted the value
of the note issues of the RiKsbank to become wholly
divorced from its gold reserves, with the result tnat
there was no limit to ^lich the value of the currency
might rise. That is, there was no longer a limiting
standard of value, Free coinage was definitely sus-
pended the latter part of April"'" after an agreement
with the other members of the Scandinavian Monetary
Union; name, Denmark and JTorway, This was a new
principle for any country to adopt, a principle which
may be defined as '*the transition to a free standard
which will be regulated irrespective of any metal and
exclusively with a view to the country's interest in
1 I- -page 83
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having a standard of value as stable as possible."
The looiced-for phencmen cm on the part of the Riks-
bank was not f crthconint^. According to the a^jreements
raade by the Scandinavian Monetary Union, before men-
tioned, Sweden was corapelled to accept tiOld from each
of these coantries. Thus it was very easy for ITorway
and Denmark to send their gold into Sweden, although
they agreed to exclude gold also, which prevented other
coantries from getting gold into Sweden via Norway or
Denmark. The banKs of Norway and Denmark were anxious
to send their gold to Sweden because of the droxD in
the val ie of their currencies.
The outcome of this unwanted movement of gold
from the Danish and Norwegian ban^vs was a letter which
petitioned for the suspension of such shipments. In
part, the letter read as follows:'^
"According to the Scandinavian mone-
tary convention of the .^7th of May, 1873,
Article IX, Danish and Norwegian gold
money coined in accordance with the rules
of the convention is legal tender in Swe-
den. This opens a way for an unlimited
invasion of gold into Sv/euen. The Riks-
iiank, \'*iich at T^resent is not a bu/er of
gold either in bfc s or in the form of
foreign gold coins, has on several occa-
sions latterly been offered to buy foreign
gold coin. Although this has been obtain-
able at prices considerable below oarit/,
these offers riave been declined. There
is, however, nothing to prevent this same
gold which the RiKsbank refused to buy
being bought for Danish or Norwegian
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ciiCcount and, after having "been reminted
into gold coin in Denmark or Norway, im-
ported into Sweden. If this is done, the
consequence will be that the RiKsbank is
compelled to take over at far in the form
of Norwegian or Danish gold coin, the
very sarae gold which the bank had previoas-
ly declined to bay at a price considerably
below _[,3ar. The cost of the minting is of
no importance in this connection, as it
represents only a fractional part of the
disagio at which the Riksbcink could have
bought the gold prior to its being re-
minted. It is obvioas tliat the dis^Dosi-
tion to pay Norwegian and Danish deots to
Sweden in Scandinavian gold coin grows in .
the sc-jrie degree as the depreciation in the
Danish and Norwegian currencies as com-
pared with the Swedish currency increases.
At present the depreciation amounts to
aoout 1% for JJanish and bfo for Norwegian
currency.
•According to an agreement privately
come to oetween them Lne three central
banks have undertaken not to recommend any
licenses for export of gold from any one
of their own countries to either of the
other tv/c Scandinavian countries without
having first consulted the central bank
of the country to which the gold is pro-
nosed to be sent. Although the Riksbank,
in a pronoimcement issued in consequence
of this agreement, has definitely de-
clared itself unwilling to receive gold,
nevertheless gold in the form of Danish
or Norwegian gold coins has been sent to
the bank. By this means Denmark and Nor-
way have managed to procure Swedish
kroner at par, whereas, liad this recourse
not been orjen, they would have had to pay
the agio on Swedish kronor prevailing at
the time in Christiania or Copenhagen,
In other words, the Riksbank has had to
stand the loss in exc?iange which the loar-
ties concerned in Norv/ay and Denma-rk
would themselves have had to bear if there
had been no clause in the monetary conven-
tion maKing Danish and Norv/'egian gold coin
legal t ender in Sweden,
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'•In order that tlie object of the
above amenciiaents of the law may not be
defeated through Danish and TTorwet^ian
^old coin being sent to Sweden, it is the
opinion of the Board that s teps sho ild be
taken to cone to an arran£;;ement for re-
voAing the clause in Article IX of the
monetary convention to the effect that
^cld coin rainted in conformity wit?i the
convention slic<,ll oe le^^al tender in the
three kingdoms, irrespective of which
Kingdom has minted it. If this clause is
revoked, it follows that the regu.la tion
in Article XITI, at present suspended,
concerning the rii_;ht to obtain gold coin
for bullion delivered to the mint, will
also have to be struck out of the conven-
tion.**
This letter led to a conference in Stockholm in
1
April, 1;»17, and resulted in an agreement to prohibit
the export of gold and for seven months Sweden was
able to bar the i.iportation of any gold. This was fol-
lowed by a period when a great deal of gold came into
Sweden from Norway and Denmark, but from the fall of
1917 the gold-exclusion policy was rigidly carried out.
A paradoxical situation existed in Sweden inasmuch
as, diring t?iis gold-exclusion priod, the RiKsbank
bought gold and was able to do so be lev/ par, which
leads to the conclusion that the unwillingness on the
part of Sweden to accept Norwegian and Danish gold was
because timl gold had to be ta.ken at par. This fact
is clearly brought to light in the letter just quoted.
The gold-exclusion policy was not a v/ise policy
for Sweden to iiave adopted. ^JIHaile she was able to
push the value of her currency to a higher value than
1 I- -page 89
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that which would have been poBsitole on the gold stand-
ard, she was not able to prevent its purchasing power,
in comparison with that of commodities, falling be-
low the purchasing power of geld. Thus after the War,
Sweden was confronted, not with an appreciated currency,
but with a depreciated currency, and what made the situ-
ation worse, Wcu3 the fact that instead of the accumula-
tion of geld exr)ected, assets of foreign countries had
ioeen accepted unci many of these were found to be worth-
less
.
The fallacy in the reasoning of the Riksbcink*s
officials in their decision to carry on this gold-
exclusion policy lay in the fact that they should have
set about to prevent the depreciation of the Swedish
currency instead of trying to r egulate its pirchasing
power, ignoring the gold standard. Their efforts
should have been to so stabilize the purchasing pov/er
of the currency that it would continue at the point
at which the purchasing x)ower of gold would return v/hen
conditions were restored to normal.
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Italy, from the tirae of the formation of the pres-
ent kingdom in 1359, to 1365, had a combination system
of d'old, silver, and paper currency, the amount of met;.il-
lic currency "bein-; a^oout four ti .es as lar^^e as the fi-
1
duciary which was convertible into ^old. In 136 5, there
was a budget deficit, war with Austria appeared proba-
ble, and the credit of the nation was considerably shaken.
Italian securities, both governmental and industrial,
were dumped on the market. They were purciiased by spec-
ulators and paid for in gold which the speculators ob-
tained from the banks and sent abroad. Thus foreign ex-
change rates rose ana it became profitable to export
gold.
Because of a f ear of the probable introduction of
inconvertible paper currency, there was a rush to con-
vert p£iper money into gold ani- to discount drafts on
the part of foreign holders. The gold funds quickly
shrunk, business was severely threatened, war with Austria
was declared, and one of the two banks wiach issued the
convertible paper money was allowed to ref ise to redeem
its notes in gold and other ")anAS were allowed to issue
1 XV- -page 765
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inconvertible pAper money.
It was not until 13B1 Ihat Italy was able to worx
out a plan whereby the amount of o itstandin^ inconvert-
ible paper money was r educed, raetullic money increased,
and coniidence restored in the Italian money maricet.
Business ex;xA,nsion and inflection was net lon^^ develop-
ing. In 188^5, the note issues of 794 million lires J^iad
a reserve of 50^, wiiereas in 1889, the note issues had
mounted to 1116 inillicns of lires and tne reserves de-
creased t o 34%.
A crisis became ii'Uainent and came to a climax in
18915 with the failure of some of the leading banjvs. The
premium on ^^old rose as hi^h as 16^ and there was much
exporting of jold and silver. Again there was' a period
of inconvertible paper currency. '/7ith an improvement
in the economic conditions of Italy, the financial sit-
uation improved, but up to the ti-ie of the World V/ar,
Italy was more or less periodically upset by calamities
v/hich let to serious budgetary deficits.
The War was disastrous for Italy*s financial condi-
tion, m 1J15, iier reserve against outstanding notes
was between 35 and 36%, Hy 1918, the notes had consid-
,
3
erably increased and the reserves decreased to 15.84%.
Italy's financial condition was in a terrible state but
Ihe H'asciat Gcverniient
,
by a system of revaluation and
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de flat ion, was able to bring about a threat iinproveiaent
.
In the latter part of 19)^7, Italy went urjon the
sin^^le ^cld standard by the passin^^^ of the Decree Law
of Decent! er 21,1927, which decreed that notes were to
be exchan^i^ed ipon demand into (^old. at a rate of exchant^e
fixed by the Bank of Issue which may not exceed the ^^old
1
export point. The ^old points were fixed at 19.10
lire to the dollar for export and 18.90 lire to the dol-
lar for iiport. All issues of notes must be covered by
a reserve in ^^old or er^uivalent credits of at least 40%
of the notes. There is a graduated tax on the amount of
all notes issued in excess of this 40/^ reserve coverage.
There is no li.uit to the amount of notes which may be
circulated, provided Lhe required reserve is maintained.
Methods of Stabilization
It will oe interesting;; here to contrast the raet?iods
used by the leading Euro_^ean countries in their attempts
at stabilization of their currencies at the close of the
World War. ^
One metiiod was that of repudiation of all the out-
standing currency. This was in effect a. statement that,
"Whatever is, is not." This method caused considerable
suffering on the part of many people. The rentier class
had their income swept away from them and were forced to
1 XV--page 780 2 J^^om notes taken in the ccirse,
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^0 to woric or tc starve. All internal debt v/as can-
celled. New indastr/ was enabled to get an excellent
stctrt and a fictitioas jros^eritj was created, oat, in
doing 30, a stable carrenc/ was created. This was the
metnod adopted b/ German/ and Hassia.
Another met/iod was the metiiod of deile. tion as was
exercised by Sn^jland. Tn her post-war straggle for
economic stability, T^ngland forced the poand sterling
to remain at ira.T . She maintained all her obligations to
her debtors. Daring the period of the War she had def-
initely lost her old place as the leading creditor of the
world, ner exjior ts decreased and her imports increased.
Heavy taxes and anemployment resulted, Sngland*s indas-
try was crippled. Interest payments were heavy and the
barden of angland's debts fell apon the owners oi prop-
erty and business
,
Italy made an attempt to go half way between the methca
ased by Germany ai d Russia and that used by England, Her
currency liad dropped about 20% in value and she adopted
the met/iod of def.'U tion. She did not v/ant tc repudiate
her currency, but, on the other hand, she \vas not in a
position strong enough to restore and maintain her cur-
rency at par, so defla tion seemed best.
A third method was that used by France, Belgium and
l^inland. They did not set out to deflate their cur-
rencje 3. They pe rely stepped to one side and, passive-
ly, as onlooicers, watched until their currencies
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reached a level at wliich they seemed to settle. T?ien
they said, "This will "be the point at which we will
stabilize. In T-^rance it meant a redaction of the
franc to approximately one-fifth of its former val le
,
which worjved hardships on the foreign creditors whose
debts were payable in "^rench francs. However, this
metjiod seems to hc.«,ve been tsie one wnich caused the
least o itward dist ir"bance in ei oiier t?ie ic eign trade
or in tne industrial life of the countries which made
•use of it.
The World In General
Most of the world has adopted the jold stcxndard.
Some have temporarily abandoned it for the second time
since the War but they have every intention of revert-
in5 to it as soon as possible, A few countries maintain
a silver s tandard. The fo/eit^-n trade of these silver-
standard countries was very badly hit by the precipi-
tous- dro-j in the silver marxet d o'im; the oas;. /ear
(l:)3l). The.y have the proolem of converting their
money into terms of the c irrencies of the two leading
old- standard nations; namely, the United States and
Crreat Britain, and, since the War, dollar exchange has
become m(.re and more widely used because cf its stabil-
ity and will continue to be so used now that the pound
sterling exchange has, for the time being, tottered.
Silver then, even though the standard of a nation,
must be made subsidiary to gold when talicing in terras
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of forei.^n exclmrii^e in trade. lis significance
t,Jier.;fore , iii cirt interna,! or local sitj;nii icance
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CIIAPTER IV--FCFETGIT EXCIIAITdE RATES
Re3.ation To Prices
.
Prior to the World War the value of the carrency
anit of each country had come to be looked Ui3on as fixed
and the relation of the varioas monetary units, one to
another, was considered to be constcmt. The carrency
systems of Europe were badly u]Dset by the War and the
problem of judging the value of each carrency unit be-
came a serious one. The par values of foreign curren-
cies have, in many cases, little actual relation to
their actual values. It will be our problem now to
analyze factors which determine the val le of one car-
rency in terms of another. This evaluation is necessary
if one is engaged in foreign trtide.
Accoiaing to the simplest analysis it can be said
that the law of supply and demand will be operative in
determining foreign exchange ra.tes. If the demand for
an exchange exceeds the sui)ply, the rate of the exchange
will rise; if the nax)ply exceeds the demand, the rate
will fall. This leads us to a question concerning de-
mand; namely, "What is the principal reason for a
foreign currency being in demand, and w^iat effect has
an alteration in the intrinsic value of that currency
1
upon the demand for the same?"
1 I- -page 138

-67-
A foreit^n currency ia in de:''iand loecause it can
be used to jircliase sometiiing that oar own currency
can not. The apio.mt we will be willin^s to pay for
the foreign currency will depend upon the relative
p.irciiasing power of cur ov/n and the forei^^n currency
in their respective countries. The law of supply and
demand is not, then, the sole factor governing the
price of foreign exchange.
When the currency of a coimtry undergoes the
process of inflation, prices rise and the purchasing
power of the currency unit falls and thus its exchange
rate also fa,lls.
In his discussion of foreign exchange. Professor
Cassel s tates that "the e xchange rate between two
cOiintries must always fix itself in accordance with
the price level in either country so that a certain
1
amount of trade between them becomes possible. Thus
he points out that a high price level in a country
will not cause a severance or dropping off of trade but
will automatically bring about a readjustment in the
value of foreign exchange in terms of the local cur-
rency. The local exchange will be bought more cheaply.
If prices are lowered, then the value of the local cur-
rency increases and it becomes more expensive to buy it
1 I- -page 143
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with foreign carrencies. Except for the short interval
daring which the exchange n^tes adax)t themselves to the
chan^^e in prices, it will not be of any benefit, from
the point of view of increasing its power in the maricets
of forei£i;n countries, for a ccdntry to lower its price
level
,
Into the problem of price levels and foreign ex-
change rates comes the factor of cost of prodicticn and
a vital factor in the cost of production is wage rates.
There miist be a relation between wages and prices. We
iiave all experienced the recent boom years when prices
rose to an extraordinary high level. Wages rose tc s ich
heights as were never before known. Nov/, in the attempt
to find a way out of this period of depression and to
stimulate buying, prices are dropping. If x^rices are
to be decreased, costs of prcducticn must go dov/n. Wages
are an important item in costs of production. Wage
cuts are being announced constantly. This drop in
prices will b ring aboiit an increased currency value and
thus lower the val le of foreign currencies in terms of
the local currency.
By examining the price level of a country then,
we are g etting back of the law of supply and demand or
the theory that if there is more foreign exchange to be
bought than to be sold, then the exchange rates will go
up. There will, therefore, be a greater demand for ex-
change if the price of the commodity or comiaodi ties for
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which the exchange is to be used in payment is more
favorable than could be obtained elsewhere.
Therefore we can see the tr ith in the statement
that "the paramo mt economic problem of Eurox)ean
countries is the stabilization on a gold basis of the
1
purchasing power of monetary units in home markets,"*
This was written about the European situation after
the close of the World War but it is just as applica-
ble now. It is not a question of restoring old pre-
war parities but of restoring home conditions to a
state of confidence and stability,
•Purchasing power parity" is the name given to
this theory of the relationship of foreign exchanges.
The following is an illustration of the method by
which the purchasing power oarity of two nal ons can
2
be determined: There must first be a common denom-
inator so that the price levels can be measured in it
terms. Let us take the pre-war index n -imbers of the
same year for Great Britain and the United Sta,tes and
let them each represent 100, The index number of the
United States would be raised in terms of a common
denominator to 486, since it took 4,86 United States
gold dollars to equal one pound sterling. Let us
suppose that prices in both great Britain and the
United States t riple d, then the index numbers would
1 II--page 144 2 I--page 140 Xyi--page 800
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be 300 and 1458, respectively, and the pound would
still be v/orth 4.86 tiraes the dollar. If, however,
prices in Great j^ritain tripled and in the Tin i ted
States doubled, then the index numbers would be 300
and 972, respectively, and the purchasing power of
the pound would be 972/300 or 3.24, instead of 486/100
cr 4.86. Or we can sa^' that the purchasing power of
the pound would be 200/300 or would liave 2/3 of its
previous purchasing ^o^er.
After the close of the War, the monetary units of
the European countries fell consideraoly and some of
the Govermaents resorted to what is Known as "peg-
ging." Pegging is the process whereby a Government
goes into its own maricet and creates a d emand for its
bills of exchange by buying them up whenever the
natural demand seems to drop off. The oound sterling,
1
which dropxjed to |54.48, was pegged at about .'14.76.
1<'rance did the same with her x'ranc . As soon as the
pegging operations ceased, the franc dropped quic^cly
from 1Q0 in 191:^ to less than 6/ in 1920. 3y pegging,
an artificial stabilization was brought about. This
stabilization was not lasting because the financial
ailments which led to the dropping off in the values
1 VIII--page 152 XVI--paje 314
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of the currencies were not cared. When peg£;;;ing ceased
in 1919, the pounds terlin^j excJiiin^e irnraediately fell.
Effect Of Inconvertible Paper Money
Inconvertible pap er money is a cause of great
fluctuations in forei^'n exchan^fie. '^lien goods are
sold at paper money prices and the paper money is
not convertiole into ^^old, the seller has no way of
jcnowing wl-iat the paper money will be worth at the
time he receives it. Because there is no necessity
for a reserve )ehind the issue of inconvertible notes,
there is no limit to the araoimt which Ccin be issued.
An increase in the amount of outstanding notes will
mean an increase in the foreign exchange fluctuations
because there is no gold moving to bring about a
1
restoration in the balance of prices.
1 II- -page 1A7)

CHAPTER V--i:iyLATIO]T OF GOLD
It3 Effects
Inflation has been defined as '•an abnormal in-
crease of money.
-'^ If tnis definition is to be con-
sidered it shoald be qualified to the extent that an
abnormal increase in money is an increase in the vol-
uiae of money so great that it "is accompanied by a
rise in the ^enercu,l price-level.'*
A ^overninent can inflate its c irroncj by i3.-3ain£j
more paper currency or by borrowing from the people
v;ho, in order to lend, borrow fror;i banks, thus in-
creasing bank creditn. With an increase in paper cur-
rency there comes a decrea,se in the value of the mon-
etary unit for it t aices more, because of competition,
to buy commodities.
Inflation of the currency of a nation brings
about a great outpouring of gold from the nation. This
was very generally true in the case of the European
countries during the War. They were forced to surren-
der a large amount of their gold reserves and these
gold reserves naturally flov/ed tc ..h.^ neutral coun-
tries in exchange fcr food and war supplies. The
banks of the countries which received thn gold, in-
stead of merely adding it to their reserves, used it
as the basis of extending credit, or as Professor
1 I I- -page 55 2 II- -page 55
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Cassel states it, 'Hhe central barucs ever/where built
apon their aagmented £ old r eserves an ever-increasing
quantity of means of payment, and this newly cj-eated
purcliasing power could not help forcing up the price
level of commodities in the various currencies which
were affected thereby, ""his was equivalent to a re-
X
duction in the purohasinj power of c^old.** A re-
duction in the purchasing power of gold is just
another way of stating that the value of gold had de-
creased.
The theory that inflation does not exist even if
paper currency does increase, provided the ratio of
gold reserves to outstanding note issues is maintained,
is not true. Inflation does exist if the currency is
2increased so as to reduce its x^urchasing power.
It even happened that in some countries during
the War the value of their currencies becaiiie less than
Lhe value of gold. This was the case in spite of, or
perhaps because of, the great inpouring of gold. The
value of gold was '•determined by ohe purchasing power
of the currencies of those countries which still had
sufficiently sound money to make it worth while send-
5
ing them gold.'* Before very long the United States
was the only country taking gold.
Inflation brings about changing x^rice-levels and
1 I--page 72 2 T--page 73 3 I--page 74
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changing jrice-levels increase the difficulties of
living and carrying on business. We have earlier
stated that whatever the cormnodity chosen for money,
it had, among other things, to be a standard of
value. One of the important eleraents in a standard
of value is that to be standard it raust remain con-
stant. Inflation b rings about a change in value be-
cause the value of the currency becomes depreciated.
Depreciation works great hardships on those who do
business on time or for credit because the value of
the currency unit may cliange from the ti.;ie of ex-
changing goods to the ti le of making payment for those
goods and in ti.ae of a depreciating currency the loss
coiild be considerable.
Inflation affects very seriously those v/ho live
upon a fixed income. Their income, in ti:aes of infla-
tion, shrinks in value by losing a great deal of its
purchasing power.
One of our economic writers"^ recently made the
statement that "Inflation is what happens when the
train of business and financial events is switched
by some untoward means, such as the WorlJ. War, off
from the safe main track of capitalism, with all its
protective devices of well-tried efficiency, and
plunges down a steep d ecline upon an open side-track
1 XVI I-b- -September 8, 1951
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under the ex_^)andinij; i ;pulse of an artificially created
parchasing power.'*
Inflation is very liitely to lead to extravagant
living. There is, in time of inflation, more money in
circulation. Therefore, there is more money that can
be spent. We must, however, not lose sight of the
fact that prices will be higher. This leads to a false
idea of prosperity. Speculation becomes rampart. So-
ciety is thoroughly arouse^^. People lose their heads.
Business profits are increased. This leads to wage
increases. Prices rise and the cost of living in-
creases, Efficiency decreases. Money bee ernes "easy*
and what is the result? The pinnacle reached is not
strong or stable enough to withstand the strain and
there is a collapse, Jfe,ny are ruined, many suffer,
and all must struggle through a period of readjustment.
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CHAPTPIR VI--?OLICIT^S 07 Dn^IATION AITD DEVALUATIOIT
Effects On Indastry
3/ deflation is raeant a decrease in the volirae of
money. In the preceding chapter it was seen hew in-
flation bro itiht about a rise in prices. Conversely,
then, deflation will "bring about a fall in prices.
Either is harmf il to the well-being of the comiaunity-
at-large because anything which leads to unstable
prices brings about abnormal living conditions and has
injurious effects upon the economic life of the nation.
Deflation usually is resorted to as a remedy for
the evils spread rampant by inflation. One of the
usual symptoms of a deflation policy is a restriction
in the issuing of ban/: credits. We saw how, during a
period of inflation, there is a general boom in busi-
ness; production increases and specula,tion becomes
rife. The banks then put forth an effort to curb this
3X)eculation and thus i ar)rove their condition. Then we
hear about such things as "frozen assets** which are
brought about by the operation of the deflation policy,
resulting in the falling of prices and the restriction
of bank credits. In carrying out this policy, the
banics are making an effort to preserve themselves,
because the values of the outstanding loans shrink and
losses in liquidation are probable,"^
1 I- -page ^38

Deflation lias a very depressing effect ux^on indus-
try. Throiighoiit the period of deflation there is con-
stantly exercised the policy of contraction. Contrac-
tion in industry nenns the ijrowth of anemplcy^aent
.
IJnemployment is the loejinning of a breakdown in the
morale of a people. The pro^lera then becomes a social
as vvell as an economic one and tlie sol.ition of this
problem- -namely , stabilization of the price level and
steady rates of excha.nge between countries'^ --is easily
said bat only attioined with great difficulty. It is
no easy matter to climb out of the pit of d epression.
People are afraid. Their economic consciences have
been hurt,
Tjien tlaa qie^tion, "If deflation shall not be ra-
sorted to, is it to be iT^valuation? " One or the other
seems necessary when v/e view the effects and results
of inflation. Let us first contrast the two--deflation
and devaluation, Mr.. John M. Keynes, the great English
economist, defines deflation as '*The policy cf reducing
the ratio between the volume of a country's currency
and its requirements of puroiiasing fjov/er in the form
of money, so as to increase the exchange value of the
carrency in terms of gold or of coramodi ties , " He fur-
ther states that devaluation is "the policy of stabil-
izing the value of the currency somew^here near its
1 I--page 240
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pre-war value.
We have spo^cen of the evils of deflation in its
accomplishraent of chanjj;es in the price level or pur-
chasing^ pov/er and the hardships imposed upon the
working classes. It is the rentier class, the non-
woricers, who benefit by this policy. It is the lender,
not the borrov/er, who gains. With the borrov/ers much
in the majority, because business today is mostly car-
ried on on the basis of loans or credit, it is only a
limited few who benefit. Reform should be Tor the
raany--not for the few,
2
Devaluation is a rmanent depreciation and is
usually resorted t.o v/hen a G-overnrient finds itself in
a position where its currency has so shrunk in value
tliat recovery to par is practically, a.nd undoubtedly
actually, ijipossible
.
By fixing the currency value at
a depreciated level, the debt burden of the country
is appreciably lessened and eased. Real devaluation
is accomplished by lav/. It is government intent, not
just a result of circumstances, which fixes the point
of devaluation. We have seen hov/ this policy of de-
valuation worked out in France after the War,
Disappearance Of Gold Currency
One of the symptoms of a period of deflation is
hoarding. As soon as tliere reaches the ears of the
1 V--page 142 Z V--page G3
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public a hint of hard ti aes to corae and thut a .oericd
of depression is to follow clcBe upon the heels of a
period of riotoas spending and .intcld extrava^jances
,
fear enters the hearts of laen. It is a fear which may
or may not be c^roandless, hut it is certainly one
which has a pernio icas influence upon recovery from
any economic slump that there may be.
During the period of rec^cless spending there is
little thought for to-raorrow. It is a case of enjoy-
ing life to the utmost by indulging in all the luxu-
ries possible. When this is quickly followed by a
retrenchment and a curtailment of spending, the. effect
is widespread. In the United States it has been esti-
mated that at thej^resent about a billion dollars are
hoarded away,"'" Tliis means that there is one billion
dollars less in circulation than there could be or one
billion dollars is failing to perform the duties for
which it was created. The amount of credit alone that
could be issued on the basis of the billion dollars
amounts to approxi lately ten billions, none of which
can be utilized. This is true because, as we ha-ve
seen, bank credit is extended to an amount several
times the quantity of the currency deposits. The ex-
tent of the loss to b isiness should be recognized.
Thus the usefulness of this hoarded money is nil,
1 XX-b—November 10, 1931
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That which is true of individuals is likev/ise
true of nations. Wot only national but international
trade is affected, G^old hoarding in one country can
create serious disturbances in other countries. Once
a lar^e stock of ^old is acouxaulated and put av/ay in
vaults it is not an easy matter tc get it out and into
circulation again. Those countries which have lost
their gold at the expense of the accumulating of gold
by other countries can be placed in very embarrassing
positions, as was the case of England diiring the pre-
vious year (1931).
If
PART II
TH3 PRESKITT SIGlTIPICiUTCS
OP CrOLD
IN WORLD AFFAIRS
1931--
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CHAPTER VII- -STERILIZATION 07 CrOW
Causes
"sterilization of gold" is meant the accumula-
tion of G»"old in 'oan-;s as a credit resource but not
used for the issuing of creait. The piling up of gold
during the past raontns in the bank vaults of the Ifnited
States and i^'rance
,
causing a very distinct maldistri-
bution of the world's supple, is given as one of the
causes of the severity of the present depression.
These two coiintries are reputed to have accLuaulated
betvreen 60^ and 10% of the v:orld*s gcld--Prance having
the larger per capita, the United States the larger
total amount. The TJnited States is said tc teve a sup-
ply of five billion dollars, a record in the history
of the world.
It is quite natural for one to question how it
came about that so much gold flowed into the vaults of
the United States and 5'rance. ITeir^hsr country encour-
aged this flight of gold. On the other hand, apparently
neither country seriously considered halting it until
conditions becaiae so ba-d that it was apparent to the
entire world what was happening.
The extraordinary increase in the gold holdings of
France is due to the following causes:^ 'S'oreign capital
flowed in as imrestments in T'rench securities. ?'rench
1 XVII--September 6, 1931 2 XVI T- -December 31, 1931

capita,!, which had been invested in other ccintries,
retirned to l<'rance in huge qaantities, France having
witiistood the effects of the 'Vorld War far better than
the other Earooean jar tici jants . 7he prices of French
i^oods rose so slowl/ in coinjar iscn with those of other
countries that foreign trade was increased and France
beccime a lar^^-e creditor. The 3anjc of France had been
very caitiois in its foreign commitments. It was in a
position to gain the confidence of other countries at
the time of the crisis in German/ and in England and
thus foreign credits were diverted to France. The
method of stabilizing the franc (see page 63) v/as the
factor v/hich contributed to the lov/ prices and stiaula-
tion of French industries.
The great increase in the gold holdings of the
United States goes bacic to the first /ears of the Y/ar.
The 'Tnited States exported lar^e aniomts of goods to
the belligerent nations and these goods were paid for
in gold. After the War, capital fled to the (Inited
States, just as to France, because Eurcx)e was upset by
s ich things as depreciated currencies and political
instability. Later large quantities of gold came flow-
ing in as settlement of foreign borrowings and continued
unsettled conditions in foreign countries."^
One economic writer has stated that tlie motive
1 XVII-j--ITcvemher ZZ, l.)31
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force behind the flow of jold into the Ifnited Htates
and France "is foiind, not in the Machinations of
financiers bat in the piling aj of ill-balanced inter-
national obligations, violent variations in expert
and i ..port trade, tremendoas changes in comriiodity
prices, and the vagaries of the bond mar.-zet, which one
ifionth eagerly absorbs foreign oonds and the next
1
month will have none of them."
Professor Jaaaes Rogers in his book, '•America
Weighs Ker Gold," states that the gold acc imalation
in the TJnited States came aooat ".^ecaise, thro igh the
extraordinary events of wartime, the outside v/orld "be-
came greatly our debtor. Because, by raising our x^^^^-
tective tariff even higher after the war, we made pay-
ment of interest and principal on this debt increas-.
ingly difficult. Because this obstacle forced the out-
side world to pay in gold. Because, under our present
elastic ban^cing system, the inflowing of gold did not
raise American prices as it must have done before the
war
.
'R'ormerly, before the War, ^^old moved from country
to country in accordance with favorable money rates and
price levels. Prices and money rates are no longer
susceptible to qaicJc changes due to the importing or
exporting of gold. Nations endeavor to maintain s treble
1 XVII-f--January 11, 1931 2 XVII-h--Oc tober 11, 1^31
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price levels and, if need 'be, sterili/.e ci<^^l'^ order
to aocomplish stabilization in the price levels and
credit conditions."^
The tiold reserves of a nation are used as a basis
for the extension of credit, the aecirit/ for the
national cirrenc/, and the pa/raent of internai-ional
debt 3. '^he latter function has caased a jreat ntruin
upon the oold resources of nations. These rorei£;n
aeots, consisting of reparations, allied debts, short-
tiiue creaits nela m lorei^n countries, and forei^^n
investments, all tend to produce a sitiaticn wnereby
the ^ola reserves of a co^mtry can be quickly used up.
Effects
This unde sired and undesirable acciiruulat ion in two
nations of the greater part of the world's sup^jly of
gold has greatly reduced the buying power of those
nations which have lost their gold. This means a re-
duction in the experts of tiie United States and France
and thus reacts ufjon the economic life of the people
of all nations. Those who cannot buy because of a lack
of the facility to secure credit are affecting those
who need the work of supplying and manufacturing goods
for foreign consuiaption.
The debts which are due to the creditor nations
1 XVI I- j- -November 22, 1^31 2 XVI I- j --November 22,
1931
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become even ^^reater b irdens for those who have to pay
but who have not the wherewithal to Kiake payment. The
resa].t is a loss to those who have sold (^oods prior to
the present and who are still awaiting payment, widch
may never come. It orings aboat the necessity for a
cancellation of many debts or results in a repudiation
of those debts. The qiie;?tion can well be considered
in the minds of many creditors, "Shall we maj<:e a grand
gesture and write off our foreign indebtedness or sluill
we hold on to the bitter end in the hope, even if it
is slight in its probability of f ilf il 'jnent , of the
debts being eventually paid?" ^o is to say wliat tho
ethics of the sitiation are? It is a difficult sit-
uation and one which is liable to leave ruin and hatred
in its trail.
Those countries wliich have a she rtage of gold will
need to make every effort to get back part of their
gold. This they can do by increasing their exports
and decreasing their imports. Their efforts, then will
have to be extended in this direction and, in an endeav-
or to do this, will liave to decrease prices to sich a
point as to attract foreign buyers. These efforts are
also likely to lead to tariff revisions by those coun-
tries wiiich already have a tariff system and a consid-
eration of the desirability of a protective tariff by
those who formerly have been free traders.
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One of the theories oj7 the ^olci standard is that
wlien tjc>l-d flows into a coantr/ in large quantities, in-
flation taJces j-l^.ce and prices rise, which .ilti.iatel/
reu ices exports, increases imports because of high do-
mestic prices, and causes the gold to flow out again.
The present situation is an apparent exception to the
rule, because, despite the increasing gold siipplies in
the 'Tnited States, prices have dropped. The reason for
this is found in the Ti'ederal Reserve System. Instead
of iising the gold for increased loans which would in-
crease circ ilation and bring a rise in prices, the
ban/cs have oeen asing this gold to pay off their in-
debtedness to the federal Reserve, which has resulted
1
in a redaction of credit. The Federal Reserve officials
have attempted to discourage this but have not been very
successful.
Ti'rance And The United States
1 Effect Of Gold Holdings
a Di:)lomatic Relations
The United States has been publicly acclaimed as a
Shyloclc because of the accumulation of so much of the
world's supply of gold in her vaults as well as in con-
nection with her insistence upon payment of the war
debts. Ignorance ratln.er than avarice, however, would
probably more nearly describe the attitude of the United
1 XVII--September 6, l.)31
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States. The world still has a ^^reat deal to learn
a'oo.it the efficient ope ration of the ^o id standci.rd
in these days of coraplex and intricate international
financial relations. The United States is not the only
country at fault. All the nations have much to learn
and it is to "be hoped that the lesson which is set be-
fore them now will be worked out with s ich tho i^^ht and
care that sufficient i^roundwork will be laid to prevent
a reoccurrence of the present distressinij situation.
France, the one European country with all the t^old
she needs--in fact, with much more than she needs--i3
not in a position to cast disparac^in^^ remarks about the
moral conduct of the United States in her methods of
hctndling her finances. "France has made good use of the
power which came into her hands with the growth of her
gold stores.
One has only to look back to the proposed Aastro-
German customs union and observe what happened to it.
This union, which would have been very advantageous to
the two comtries involved was distasteful to "France.
Under normal circi.imstances
,
GeTm-a.nj might have snapped
her fingers and retorted that it was not France's af-
fair. Circimistances
,
however, were not normal. France
held all the gold--gold much needed to strengthen the
fast-weakening financial organizations of the rest of
Europe
.
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Go.ld can be a powerful weapon--po\verful enough
in this case to bring about the collapse of this cus-
toms union, \7ith so much gold, in her coffers, France
was in a position to maj<e loans zc the rest of tne
iiuropean nations. These loans were made, but they were
short-term loans, and when a nation is dependent upon
short-terra loans, which at any ti ie can 'oe qaicxly
withdrawn, it is in a position which makes it advis-
able to bow to the dictates of tne lender. This fact
is borne out by the fact that in May, 1931, (the
customs union plan itad been announced March 21, 1931}
one of Austria.* s most important banKs was m a condi-
tion of collapse. The withdrawal of short-term credits
by France was partly responsible for this.''" It weald
be childish to think that this v/as a mere coincidence,
it has also been stated that the bankers of France
W3nt so far as to bribe Aistria with a loan of
^21,000,000 if Austria would abandon the unicnand sub-
ject herself to international financial control.*^
Fortunately Austria did not have to s ibmit to this.
But France accomplished the abandonment of the customs
union,
France was able to get a strangle hold upon Eng-
land. It was pitiful to see the once world leader bow
her head. The Bank of England came to the rescue of
1 XVII-a--Septeraber 13, 1^31 2 XVII-a--September 13,
1931
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Austria with an extension of credit, France retaliated
b/ not only withdrawini^ her short-term credits at sach
a pace as to make for a crisis in the banking world of
England, "bat also withdrew fjold which she had deposited
in the vaults of the Bank of England, This was in
June, 1931, but in August of the same year, "France re-
versed her tactics and joined the United States in ex-
tending credit of ^^^650 , 000 , 000 to England, She had,
however, made herself felt.
During 1951, ?rance rias made the following loans
ki
to other European nations:
In March .^.42, 000, 000 to Rumania
n April 50,000,000 i« Czechoslavakia
K i« 40,000,000 It Poland
II May 42,000,000 It Jugoslavia
It August 25,000,000 II Hungary
It would be difficult to argue that indebtedness
Stich as this does not put the borrower under obligations
to the lender and l^rance has been far-sighted enough to
take advantage of the opportunity to establish her power
throughout the continent.
b Trade
ihe United States lias suij.ered daring a prolonged
period of depres;3ion. Her trade has been badly hit,
France seemed to v/eather the storm of depression better
than any of the other countries, which is rather sur-
prising considering the fact that she is a producer of
1 XVII-a--Sept. 13, 1931 2 XVTI-a--Sept. 13, 1931
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luxur/ rroodB, trade in wliich one would imagine would
"be reuiiced first of all. Conditions in France, how-
ever, have conformed merely nearly to standard than
they did in the United States. V^ith the increase in
2old, prices remained high and so eventua.lly trade
fell off and Prance has "been feeling the strain of the
depression Just as the United States has,
Z Efforts Of The United States
To uheck cfola Abgorption
The United liJtates, txirougn tne Feaeral ne serve
System, started about the middle of Aijril, 1931, to
check the flow of gold into tne unitea states. Her
attempt v/as handicai)ped v/hen two leading exchanges,
those of Germany and Canada, fell belov/ the point at
which it would be profitable to ship gold to the United
States. This drop in the value of the marK and the
Canadian dollar brougnt about an increase ol about
;s>26 ,500,000 in gold supplies of the United States,
1|l23,505,000 of which came from the sale of earmarked
gold by the Keichsbank in oraer to secure exchange.
During the x>eriod from the middle of September
to the midule of uctober, 1^31, tne gold reserves of
the United States werr rf^duced by s^649 , 000 , 000 , the
largest movement of geld out of the ccwt-TTj in its
1 Earmarked gold comes from credit "established by
foreign central banks with our "^edera.l Reserve and
converted into gold held by the l^ederal Re-
serve for account of the foreign banxs and counted
as part of their reserves, '•--XVII--October 13, 1951
2 XVI I- -June 14, 1131

hibtory. Of this amount, y-pproxirac^.tely .'!?o50, 000, 000
wp.s sarmarked and :;^250, 000, 000 actually exported.
The fact that the countries of Europe v/ere enabled
to effect this moveraent despite their impoverished
condition was due to their possession of "large
floatin^^ credits" in the form of short-term loans and
large araounts of American securities, both of v/hich
2
could he converted into gold. A redistribution of
the gold supply is thus being effected and should aid
in restoring stability to the European currencies. It
is unfort mately true, however, that France, v/ho does
not need the gold is receiving a large sliare of it.
1 XVII--OC tober 13, 1931 2 XVII--Oc tober 18, 1^31
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CHAPTEH VIII- -THE GERI-IAIT H^ICHrvBAlTK
Threat Of rreman Crash
Since the War, German/ has been ratiking a noble
effort to regain the firm position which was pulled
from under her feet when she went down to defeat.
Stripped of her ^aude and her merchant marine, a large
number of her men and part of her territory, Piuch of
her iron and her coal resources, recovery }ias been
difficult. She was further J-iandicapped by ?ier obli-
gations to pay reparations. Germany may have fallen
but she was not crushed. It became a matter of seeding
and following the best methods of reconstruction. It
was not, however, a si.iple matter nor one that could
be accomplished i-iuaediately , Her recovery industrially
has been little short of miraculous. Politically she
is still unsettled--not yet really tlirough the revolu-
tion of 191B. SconomLcalLy she is badly off, the rep-
arations payments having Kept her with her back to the
wall, deprived of an opportunity to accumulate enough
capital to keep herself steady at a time such as this
through which the world has just been passing.
Before we can review the present crisis, it is
necessary to go back and review the subject of German
reparations and the allied v/ar debts. Some rjeople
woiild probably prefer L o keep these tv/o obligations
quite separate. They were distinctly different in
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their inception, reparations being the penalty imposed
apon German/ for the dcima^^e she caused in the War,
whereas the allied war d ebts represented loans, raaae
principally by the United States to the allies. How-
ever different they may have been, they have now be-
come interde^jenuent and interrelated. iney are both
debts ana tne interrelation and interdependence of
nations in our present economic scheme of life make
anything of consequence to one nation a.ffect every
other nation directly or indirectly. rrermany*s ability
or inability to pay the allies aj'iects t}ie allies'
ability to pay tne united ^;tates.
A picture of the interrelation of the war debts
is given on the next page. J'rom this chart we can see
how the payments go from Germany into the world bank
and from there into the treasuries of the allies and
of the United States.
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(.remttny ha.s ccntinaall/ worked for a reduction
in rexmrc^tioris . She made every effort oo meet pay-
ments. A sapreme attempt was made to balance the
budi^et but the depression's effect had made itself
felt. '"he German Cabinet early in <iune, 1951, issued
1
a s tcitei'ieut v/hich in x^art is as follov/s:
"We have done everything v/e could to
meet those oblit;ations laid down upon
us as a result of the lost war. After
drawing upon the last ounce of re-
serve and the last atom of strength
still possessed by our people we have
tne ri£iht, nay it is our duty to our
country, to announce openly before
all the world that we have reachsd
the li.iit of the sacrifices .ve are able
to lay upon our people.
''The government is convinced that the
eccnuaic and finctacxai condition of
Germany, threatened as it is in ex-
treme decree, deiaands relief from the
insupportable reparation obligations.'*
2
This feeling of panic was due to several causes:
the insolvency oi ti:e large Austrian banK, the ivredit-
anstalt; the shrinkage in the gold reserves; the
deficit in the German budget; the withdrawal of foreign
capital and credits; and the flig?it of the mark accom-
plisned by tne tioriestic sale of marks for foreign ex-
c hange
.
Action Of Leadinp- ITaticns
Chancellor Bruening and Foreign Minister Curtius
appealed directly in person to the i^ritisn ucverniaent
,
1 AVI T_e-_,rune 7, 1931 2 XXI I- -September 19, 1931
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asking for a revision of the reparations payments
,
1
This wa3 on Jane 6, 1931. England syrajatliizea with
the uerraans but offereci no help, tlie feeling in Eng-
land being that any action shoald cone frcn the United
States.
During the next week the attention of Washington
began to be actively locaseci apon xhe sit-aaoj-on. The
Reichsbank raised its discount rate fron to 1% be-
cause of the large withdrawals of gold and foreign
currencies. In the two weeics Just endea tne neicns-
brt,nK naa lost abouL $?>00 , 400 , 000 in gold and foreign
excha^nge. What is called a "flight from the mark,"
the exchange of marks for foreign currency, was tuicmg
XJlace. xhe rise in the discount rate was a blow to
Lierman inaustry. I'o imxDrcve the position of the mark,
gold ciiaounting to J^66,0b9,900 was released from e&,r-
mark to tlie federal Reserve Bank.*^ Due to credit re-
strictions there was a sharp decline in thie stock
4
raarke t
.
Germany has never really recovered from the ef-
fects of the f=;reat depreciation of the mark. Another
period of depreci<n,tion was feared as a result of the
depression and t?ie draining of gold to pay reparations,
loans and interest. Trierefcre the ncvaiaent of redeeming
1 XVII-i--June 7, 1931 2 XVII--June 14, 1931
3 XVI I- -June :^.l , 1931 4 XVII- -July b, 1931
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marics in t^cld became widespread. Tliis brcui^ht about
a hoardings of <30ld within the coimtr/. On the other
hand, holders of short- terra credits v;ith Germany also
became possesseil of the same fear and they "begau to
withdrav/ these credits. This led to a very tense
banxing situation. The Reichsbank realized tlie dan-
gers inherent in this Ictck of faith in the mark and
many banxs were forced to close.
The critical condition of f^ermany wa.s evident
when ons of -Berlin' 3 la^g'^st bank'? was forcf=»d to
clns^. !Piirther evidence was shown by the drop in
tiie Keicnsbank's c^old and foreign exchan(^e reserve
to 55. 8^^, ^,2% below the minimuni legal requirement.
Two bank holidays were d eclared and restrictions v/ere
placed upon the operations of all banks except the
Reichsbank and the Gold Discount Bank, thus placing
control of all foreign exchange operations in the
hands of the Reichsbank.
The drain upon the foreign exchange reserves of
the Reichsbank continued and the situation became so
critical that i-uaediate measures became necessary.*^
The measures considered were: A strict curtailment of
the demand for foreign exchange on the Reichsbank
except for business purposes; further credit restric-
tions;
-and a reduction of the legal 40?^ gold coverage
1 XVII--August P., 1931 2 XyiI-d--.Tuly 12, 1931
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for notes in c ircalati on. An ct^ioeal n-is made to the
United States ciskin^ that credits be placed at the
disposa.l of German/. The i^old reserve of the Reichs-
banic >iad become 30 low that another dny^s run wo aid
exhaast it entirely.
France e. pressed herself as being willing; to make
a loan to German/ but attached the following terras;"^
"Suspension of the program for building
'pocket battleships.*
'•Abandonraent of the proposed Austro-Ger-
man oustoms an i on
.
"Further credit restrictions in German/.
••Inauguration of measures to prevent
the flig?it of c;p ital.
"Creation of a *Locarno of the East.*
In other words, the formal relin-
quishiaent for all time of an/ hope
of regaining Danzig and the Polish
Corridor. **
This is an illustration of "Prance *s gold diplomac/
discussed in the preceding chapter, ITaturall/ Germany
could not agree to these proposals and so made her
appeal to the TTnited States.
President Hoover came to the rescue of German/
with his proposed debt holiday. This plan was met with
great approval in Germanj/ out was blocked by France for
some time, so long in fact that some of its usefulness
was lost because of the delay. It was finally agreed
1 Xyil--d— July 12, 1^31
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upon and the German situation seemed to clear. The
sagpension of the international delfts meant that
German/ would have over .9400,000,000 to apply to
the baildin^i up of her industries and commerce be-
cause she was relieved of pa/in^; tliis amount for
reparations. This debt moratorium is to last until
X
the end of June, 117j':1,
The ;^ederal Reserve acted ver/ generously in the
extension of credit to Germany by continuing to re-
ceive and discount billt? drawn by German ocncerns and
the Reichsbank agreed to sell foreign exchan^^e to
those banks which had to send remittances to New Tork
to meet acceptances whicli were maturing,
American, British, and ?'rench hankers voluntarily
agreed not to withdraw any more she: i-term credits
from Germany and the Government of Germany found it
expedient to allow other foreign creditors to withdraw
their short-term credits only v/ith special permission.
The decree*^ provided that foreign exchange, claims in
foreign exchange, and foreign securities tliat were not
listed on the German exchange, could be bought with
reichsmarks only through the agency of the Re ichsbc^iixc
and could "be sold only to the Reichsbank, All trans-
actions in foreign exchanges, as well as gold or silver,
1 XVII--g— July 19. 1931 2 XVTT..August 2, 1931
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against German currency was forhiciaen.
(jerraan/'s laci^ of ^old to pay her reparations is
net the only reason for t?ie necessity of declaring a
debt moratorium. The causes do not lie only in Ger-
many herself hut are due to contributing causes through-
out the world. These contributing causes are the laci^
of gold in the countries with wliicn Germany has carried
on an exporting bisiness and the breaking down of the
purchasing pu.ver in the silver-using countries of the
Y/orld. About eight-tenths of the world's gold supply
is held by the United States, 7rc-.nce, England, and
Germany. Of tiie v/orld's estimated population of
2,000,000,000 people, only about .300,000,000 people
1
live in these four countries. The maldistribution
of gold can plainly be seen from these figures.
Effect Of Debt Moratorium
l^'oreign loans as well as reparations have consti-
tuted a mcjst iiftportant reason for (Germany's weak
financial condition. Germa.ny borrowsd extravagantly
during the period from 1??A to l'^P,3, v/hen every issue of
bonds pit on the market was hastily sibscribea lor,
ihe united h:tates had laore capitcJ. than it needed,
Germany had lost hers d iring the period of inflation,
so Germany borrowed v/idely in the Tin i ted States.
1 XVII-c--August 9, 1931
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The loans nere .L^ed to a ^reat extont for public im-
provements which offer no direct re tarn suc?i as would
brin(^ ahoat raeans of rerjayraent to tne leiiaers. tJo
far, Germany has paid iier reparations by loreign
loans. it really aiaoiuits to tne inct that the people
of the United States have made loans to Germany, tiiese
lo8.ns have been ised ap in Germany bat practically
their eqiiivp^lent rJxus beei'i pciid oat by Ger:n;i,:ay as rep-
arations, and t}.e reparations have come back to the
United states in the form of payments on the allied
war debts.
The present t^ola ref^orve m Germany has shrunk
to about '13% of its circulating notes. This shrink-
age in the gold reserves continued even after the
moratcri^ira for short-term credits because many of the
German banks took advantage of the drop in the value
of the British pound to pay off JBritish obligations.
The fate of Germany is not yet decided. The
moratorium declared by President Hoover, which post-
poned reparations and intergovernmental debt payments
until July 1, 1:^32, and the bankers* moratorium or
'*s tandstill" agreement, ^ich extended the ti ie of
short-term private credits until February 29, 1932,
have both given Germany an opportunity to regain a
firm footing. This, however, has been impossible.
The probability that she would be unable to meet her
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oToligHtions in "'^'ebruar/ "became apparent by the beginning
of 193;^, Chancellor 3ruening publicly announced that
payment woald be impossible. The latest developiaent
is an agreement by an international committee of bank-
ers to extend for one year short-term credits amounting
to a billion dollars. This extension is to run until
January 5, l.)33. This agreement may be terminated if
Germany declares a moratorium on foreign debts, if the
bank for international settlements refuses to renew
credits placed with the Heiohsbank, or if a majority
1
of the creditors deem it advisable.
As for the res imption of her reparation payments
next J ily t that also seems quite mlikely for Germany's
finances are still in a turmoil.
1 XVTTI--Jan';ary 193-^,

-105-
CHAPTTilR TX--AB0LJTION 07 Tt^, GOIJ) STAITDARD
Si^;nif icance
When a coaatTj ojerates financial I/ under ».he
^old standard, it raeans that that coiintr/ issues
carrenc/, the mit of value of which is eoual to a
fixed qiiantity of jold in a market into which and
from which jold can freely flow. The ^^overmaent of
a coantr/ o_jeratin^ on the ^^iold standard rjaarantees
that its tiOods, services, and jr>.dici^s I'lciy he ex-
chanjed for ^ old or trie equivalent of gold.
In the 'Tnited States, the ^jold dollar is the
unit of vnJ.ue. Kvery gold dollar mast contain 23.22
^jrains of ^pare ^old. In an ounce of jjold there are
430 grains. Therefore each dollar contains
of an 0 ince of gold or each ounce of gold is worth
^20.67. This is the price fixed hy the United States.
If then, a person had an ounce of gold "bullion he
could take it to the mint, have it made into coin and
receive .'$20.67. He would, of course, have to pay a
small charge for Ljie service. Thus, when we speak
of a dollar, we Know that in terms of gold it is al-
ways worth the same amount. The value of gold may go
ui) or down according to the economic law of supply
and demand but the dollar in terms of gold remains
the same
.
W>ien a country goes off the gold standard it
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is no Icn^^er willing or in a pcsiticn to £;;Liarantee
pa/ment for its ti'oods, s<=^rvices, or products in
gold, A coantr/, however, will think very carefully
"before it takes the s tei of suspending its gold
standard. It means that the exchange v;ill he greatly
upset. The unit of currency v/ill no longer he re-
deexaable in gold. The price of the country's ex-
change will undoubtedly drop because if the country
was able to maintain the exchange at par there would
probably be necessity for going off the gold standard.
The suspension of the gold standard is not such
a dreadful tiling to ha^re to declare as many peorjle
would believe. It may be the only thing that will
restore normal conditions. ITaturally, at first, the
shock of Clearing that a co intry has gone off the gold
standard brings aoout a wavering in confidence of that
country. In the long run, however, if a country finds
itself drained of its gold reserves and with prospects
of a continued demand upon it for gold, it will do
well to suspend gold pa^oaents until stability is once
more brought about. This is true as long as Uie gold
standard system operates as it does today.
Since the spring of I'.K^l, deflation has taken
place rapidly; so rapidly, indeed, tyiat the commodi-
ties which were offered as collateral were in no way
equal to the loans, ""rade fell off, an extraordinary
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lack of demc-.nd fcr ^ocds -f^n ilted, the e;0-lcl jrices of
predicts fell qaiciil/, the framework of business
collapsed under the weakening of its credit raechanism.
The raaldistrib it ion of ^old and the wi tlidraAWB.l of
short-time credits, alon^j; with tiie disor^janization of
traue, internal and external, present araple cause for
the 3 IS pens ion of t>ie ^^old standard.
Now let us turn to Great Britain and see what
happened to her t^old standard.
Great Britain
1 Causes
It is now the ^jeneral concensus of opinion that
Great Britain, in reestablishing in 19^5 the pound
sterling at par or ^4,86 ^ made a mistake. England
has alwa/s been very scruouloiis about paying her debts
and maintaining her honor. She considered it the more
honorable policy to restore the pound to the pre-war
value than to fix it at some lower point. On Sefjtem-
ber 21, 1931, she found it necessary to suspend the
gold standard.
English banks held consiaerable short-term German
credits. When these became frozen, one source of gold -
becarie blocked up, "Punds araounting to #100,000,000
1
were being withdrawn at a time, A measure to protect
herself from these large drafts was ta^-en. A loan of
1 XXI --November, 1931
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1
•$650,000,000 from banks of France and the United
States was negotiated in an attempt to conserve her
reserves "bat this only delayed the inevitable break.
In the middle of the summer of 1931, when the crisis
came in Germany, England began to experience heavy
withdrawals of gold.
Since 19^9, prices throughout the world have
dropped. Silver suffered a spectacular decline and
for those countries on a silver standard or those
who were finding themselves with depleted gold re-
sources, it became increasingly difficult to trade
with the larger of the gold standard countries. Busi-
ness contracted, credits became less liquid. Great
Britain's debtors found it difficult to pay in terms
of the pound sterling in gold. Thus her credits be-
came frozen. Great Britain has, during the last
fifty years, been losing her status as the world's
leading creditor. Ker i.aports increased while her
exports fell off.
The change in the relation of Britain's exports
and imports has brought about an unbalanced external
budget. The result of an external unbala,nced budget,
in addition to an internal unbalanced budget, as has
become the case with Great Britain, mea,ns that her
exchange wo ild sell at a discount or her gold re-
1 XX-c--September P.?., 1931
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serves would be drained. Tjnfortanately "both of these
things liave hnp^^jened to Great Britain,
2 Effects
After the S'lspension of the gold standard, the
valae of the pound sterling depreciated and it v/as
q.icttjcl oP. the excjiange as low as :|o.39, par being
.$4.36, This is not mprecsdented, however, because,
during the War, it dropped to
-f/^.'P.O, The effect of
this depreciation in the value of the pound will be
to increase the export t rade of Great Britain and will
discourage the import trade. This v/ill result be-
cause now more cp.n be bought for the sane price. In
terms of United States mone/, it now takes only about
1^3.40 to buy what formerly cost |>4,36. On the other
hand, with LI an Englishman can buy only $3.40 worth
of goods with the si-ime unit which previously allowed
him to p.tr chase -$4. 36 worth. The result will be,
given sufficient tiuie, a balanced external budget.
With her refusal to pay out gold. Great Britain
stepped the depletion of her gold reserves. Now she
is free to accumulate as much gold as she can without
the necessity cf being called upon to pay it out as
fast or faster than she can accumulate it. The Bank
cf England no longer has the oblign-tion to sell its
gold at a fixed price.
While Great Britain is off the gold standard, the
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pound sterling has no fixed value in terms of the
Girrencies of other co.mtries. Its val.ie is depen-
dent, not ipon a ^old redeiaj^)ti on yal.ie, but apon
the flactuations in trade v/liich affects the supply
or deraand for t'ne pound sterling exchange and a.l3o
upon the state of confidence or lack of confidence in
the country.
3 Possibility of Restoration
Wlien Great Britain suspended the gold standard,
the i-^plication v/as that it was t(. be temporary only.
It was to last only to such a time as a readj us t:aent
can be brought aboiit that v/ill stabilize her financial
condition. At the tine of the suspension it was
tho ight that six months would be ample time for this
adj istment to take pla,ce. "R'our months hii.ve elapsed
and conditions liave not.chaxiged very much.
In her return to the gold standard, Crreat Britain
must consider what policy she is going to adopt.
Should she devaluate or should she restore the x)ound
sterling to par? The probability is that she will
devaluate. Devaluation will certainly be less painful
and she has recently experienced the results of at-
tempting to maintain the pound at par.
As the value of the pound depreciates, prices in
England v/ill rise. "'hen, with ?iigher prices estab-
lished, to bring the poimd back to par, hardships will
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be imposed apcn the people. The reaction wcjld un-
doabtedly "be a vioio is circle mierein the export
trade v/oald fall off a^^ain and the imjcrt trade in-
crease
.
If Great Britain devaluates, her export trade
will he fMrther stimulated, emplo/ment would ha in-
creased because industry would be ^^i^ren new life and
this would mean a reduction in the dole which has
'oeen one of the factors which has aided in sapping
1
England's strength. On the other hand, it is argued
that devaluation v/ould mean the loss of London* s
position as an international financial center. Would
the growth of i;uports offset t?ie loss of bantling com-
missions? Also Britain's foreign investments pa/able
in sterling amount to billions of pounds, A redaction
in the po md means a reduction in the value of these
investments. These things England will have to weigh
and evaluate. At present it is impossible to tell
what she will do. Progress has been slov/er than an-
ticipated. She }ic),s before her the results of "^ranee's
policy of devaluation which took place after the War.
She must choose, then, whether she will follov/ this
example or whet?ier she will again taj<:e up the struggle,
which has once failed, of maintaining the pound sterling
at par.
1 XXIII- -Oc tober 7, 1931
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The Ccinadian Situation
1
"Canada's Gold Standard Only Noininal Nov/'^ --so
ran the newspaper headlines --bringing nearer hone
another example of the decline in value of the nation-
al carrenc/ of a neighboring ccuntry and revealing
still farther the hectio state into \v?iich world
finances haAre fallen.
This annc mcei'ient or jironoimcei'ient cane in less
than a iionth after Great jiritain's suspension of the
gola otand:i,rd and only after a decided drop in the
value of the Canadian dollar. On January 11, 1952,
the Canadian dollar was quoted at 84 (par lOO), an
exceedingly low point for this exchange. Its recov-
ery has not been so rapid as the Government expected
it to be, raaking it apparent that it v/as not merely a
reaction to the state of affairs in the mother country
but showing inherent weakness in Canada's own situa-
tion,
Canada did not formally announce a temporary re-
pudiation of the gold standard. In fact. Premier
Bennett stated very definitely, "Canada will honor her
obligations in accordance with the terms cf her bor-
rowing contracts." TrJ.s statement v/as piAt to a test
very shortly after beca.ise, on October 1, a Government
1 Xrx- -October 10, 1951 2 XIX- -October 10, 1,^31
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loun raatared. Tnile Canadians who Pie Id the "bonds had
to take Dominion ncte:^, all foreit^n holders were paid
in jold or ita equivalent. Thus the effect, as far
as other countries were concerned, of the depreciated
dcllar, was nil. The banks, hcv/ever, did all they
could to prevent an oatpcuring of ^jold by refusing to
pa/ out oold and the Crovernment made every effort it
could to buy all the ;jold mined on Canadian territory.
Canada has done most of its financing; through the
ITnited States .-,0 this decline in the dollar has "been
very serious. An outcome which can he expected is that
Canadci
-.vill float its next loan tliro i^h Canadian bank-
ing ?iouses because of the expensivenens of Nev/ York
f inane i no-.
Due to the effect cn Canadian trade, resulting
from the de_^)rec iated pound sterling, t}ia Government
took certain remedial meanures -A'hich proved to be con-
tradictory in nature. It first decreed that ''for the
purpose of collecting duties, the value of importa-
ticns from coimtries with depreciated currencies would
be based upon the rate of excJiange on the date of
shipment.""'' This decree broucht forth a storm of pro-
te-^ts from man^jfac turers because it was follcvred by
cancellations of orders placed with local factories
1 XIX- -October 10, 1931
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and sent tc British factories, wliich were receivinc
preference due to the depreciated value of the joand.
A second decree was then issued which stated that
'•for dut/ pirposes, the value of shipments from Great
Britain should he compited as if the pound were at
1
par." This was still more favorable for Great Brit-
ain's interests than Canada's so a t}iird e diet was
announced. This was that "the difference between the
depreciated pound and tJie par pound should be col-
lected as durapin(5 duty on all ira;jortat ions from Brit-
ain.'* There was considerable protest at this be-
cause man/ felt that it would result in a.n embargo
on British imports which would lead to the severing
of trade relations with Great Britain. Protests v/ere
both local and British. Local because the fluctuating
value of the pound led to difficulties in making price
quotati ons and British protests were forthcoming be-
cause of the fact that there was a complete nullifica-
tion of the trade advantages which Grea."G liritam ga-
pected to gain by suspending the gold standard.
Just what an alienation of trade relati ons between
Canada and Great Britain v/ill lead to is questionable,
but the probability is that it will be only temporary.
Canada has not been obliged to a.nnoance an abandonment
of the gold standard and Great Britain }ias repeatedly/'
1 XIX- -October 10, 1^31 2 XIX- -October 10, 1931
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announced that her suspension is to be temporary only,
30 v;hen normalcy is restored trade will be resumed on
a basis favorable to the two coantries which have so
many close ties.
Other Nations
Repercussions of the financial conditions of the
leading European coantries have been felt throughout
the continent. On September 23, 1931, just one week
after Great Britain did so, Swerlen, Norway, and TSgypt
suspended the gold standard. Gold is the international
currency, and as such, is of importance to all nations.
The gold situation in one country ref]e cts itself
either beneficially or disastrously in the commercial
and international debt relations of all otlier countries.
Poland set about making very definite tax reforms
to avoid a deficit in her budget, Japan suspended the
gold standard, December 14, 1931, and set up a gold
embargo to prevent her supply of gold from being
drained,
France is the only European country which need
have nc present fear of a gold shortage. Even tliose
still maintaining the gold standard need to watch
their finances and to husband their gold resources if
they are to weather the present long-continued period
of depre&^cion and unsettled world conditions.

PART III
SUimRIZATION
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CHAPTT3R X--ARrr'TJ-KITTS ^OR AND A'lAIMST
rroLD STAirnAKD
The present unsettled conditions in the mcnotary
s/steras of the world revive the old discussion of
standards. All will adnit that some standard is nec-
essary, "be it the ^^old standard, tlie silver sta-ndard,
a hi-fieta-llic stctndard, or an/ other comrriodit/ stand-
ard that one mii^ht name. It is ohvious that the se-
lection of the standard must he a metal. !Tc other
coinnodit/ has the qualities necessary for a, standard.
Once a standard is adopted b/ a government, the govern-
ment mast he prepared to accept the commodity at a
stated, prefle termined, fixed price. Gold and silver
are the two cormiodi ties which have preeminence in any
discussion of a choice of a standiird.
We have previously seen tliat jold hecaiae the choice
of most of the nations of the world. Gold is more val-
uaole than silver inasmuch as more silver is mined than
gold. The relative scarcity of gold in comparison with
the supply of silver ma<es gold the more desirahle due to
the fact t?iat the supply of gold is ade.iuate for the
needs of the world. There is not, then, an actual
sccircity in the supply of gold at the present. It is
a question of relativity. Tn gold we lia^^e as nearly a
stable standard of vpl ue as it is possible to secure
in any commodity.
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If silver were the stnadard it wo aid raean that
aboat fourteen ti-ies raore "bullion woiild have to he
handled than is necessary under the ^old standard.
This is d'.ie to the variation in val'ie. This Y.'culd
make tlia process of internal: ional exchange of bullion
more expensive and would necessitate more storage
fac ilitios
.
Arii unents respect to a binetallic, or two
metal, as opposed to a sin^^le metallic system liave
already "oe-m advanced, (See Chapter II) The ccn-
fasion of a biiaetallic system and tlie complexities
which arise in its operntion ma.<:e it inconvenient to
use and adrainister.
Gold has come to "be considered as the most satis-
factory standard for tie monetary system of a nation.
Because of this the jold standard has become the in-
ternational standard. Even so, the ^^old standard may
prove undesira"ble . This v;-ill "be tr ie if there is a
continuance of a, maldistribution of the v/orld*s supply
of gold. If the bulk: of the gold resources are locked
.ip in the coffers of one or two countries, the rest of
the world wilL find the gold standard impractical and
anv/crkable because they y/ill have nothing with which
to operate or an insufficient amount to carry on the
necessary international payments which must be made
under our prt:;3ent mode of international dependence.
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irnder s ich circ iirafitanceB there wo ild have to he a
ijeneral denial of the prac ticahili t/ of the ^^'old
standard accordin,^ to its present method of cjerpt-
A raan.'i^ed c.irrency, -/hereh/ a jovernment can
stabilize its internal j-'ices in;t/ he considered de-
sirable. Under a s/stem of raanat^ed carrency, the ex-
change rates as hetv/een countries will flactuate. A
mana^';ed c irrenc/ would need wise adiaini strati on . The
prcba/oilit/ of a. continued v/ise adininistra cion under
a s/stem of ever-chan^^ins political leaders is un-
liivcly. One false step could lead to disastrous
effects. Too niich de_:xjnds u^cn the financial /;;uidance
and 'visdom of those v/ho handle the monetary 2:)rohlems
of a country to warrant the possibility of thinking
that a manci.^ed c irrency would be likely to succeed.
F/iatever the standard may be, it should be one
which will work not only internally but externally, ITo
longer ca,n the financiaJ. difficulties of a country be
considered as a domestic problem only. TTot only inter-
nationa.l trade but foreign inveat. , iits make this im-
possiiole. No one country is s;ifficient ante itself.
Ever since the world was created there h.as been a
movement forward. At ti les there have been setbacks.
At tiies the Fioveraent has been slight. Tievert hole ss
there has been progress, progress which can be evidenced

b/ develo;)ments wh.ic?i have -&aK:en place within tYie span
of oar own liveB. If this is trae, t}iere is no reason
to think that beca ise the i^old standard has failed in
Great jiritain and elsew/iere that it is a failure as a
plan. The idea of the ^'oll standard is essentially
correct. Tne present operation of the cs^ld standard
leaves mach to be desired. Kore is wliere pro^jress is
needed. The attentirn cf t?ie entire world is focused
on (^?old. Steps nast be taKen and, I believe, Y^rill be
taken, to iraprove the mechanism in the struct are and
the modas operanti of the i^old standard.
Geld has become the measiirin.^ stick or the /ard-
stick of valae throa^^hoiit the world. It is the inter-
national currency. Its value as such is in its inher-
ent (^lalities. It is not a change to another ccramodi ty
that is desirable, but tlie accomplishment of stability
in the standard which already exists.
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ITeans of Stabilization
If the world is to continue on a gold standard
basis with tliose coantries which have temporarily sus-
pended it j^oing back to ^old, something nust be done to
stabilize conditions. Stabilization can be brought
about only by international agreements. When Great
Britain went off the gold standard in 1931, Mr. Snowden
expressed the opinion that he would welcome an inter-
national gold conference.
One raethod of stubilizaticn is the roaintenance of
1
an internal price level. The maintenance of a fixed
Xjrice level v/ill KeexJ the currency of a country at its
gold parity. An international agree.ment which v/ould
control .the money rates of the world would control the
at'iount of banics credits, and at the same tine control
price levels. The amount whicn one has to x^ay for
money i/vill determine how miich one will use. The
amount one uses determines the ttmount of bank credits
under o.ir present system of doing business. As money
becomes easy, more is used. Prices become higher, gold
begins to flow out, reserves shrink, and the gold
standard becomes harder and harder to maintain. Thus
the necessity for stabilization.
J^fore international stability can be achieved, it
1 XXII 1- -October 7, 1931 I- -page 269

-12^,-
is neceasai-v 'to attain internal or nationa.1 stabiliuy.
This should lie the fir^t airi of each country. It is
quite true tnat there is considerable interrelation
betv/een national and international finances. In the
solving of doi'iestic ^jroblejaa there is the ^jossioility
and ^probability of rvrrivin,^ n.t the answers to inter-
na tiona,l jr obiems.
The value of tiold should be fixed. This can be
i
accoraplished by a control of the distribution of gold.
If much of the v/crld*s supfjly of tsold beocjnes settled
in one jlace, and this is quite _^jossible because it is
Juat what has tc;-ken place recently, the demand for
^cld elsewhere ^vill cause a rise in the v-ilue cf gold.
This fluct.uation in the v:-'! ue of gold can be eliminated
by restricting the amount of gold that can be retained
as reserves by the banK:s cf a co.mtry,
A flexible jr^T d standard niglit be desirable. This
is debatable and questionable but worthy of consideru,-
tion. It is the compeu.s:ited dollar system advocated by
PrcfcGscr Irving :^:.bher. The currency unit of G.ny
cou.itr^
,
of coirse, could be substituted for the dol-
lar. According to this system, tht dollar is flexible
in that varying quantitio.v oi gold could be given in
exchange for paper dollars, tlie amount of b^ld ex-
clianged being such an '^mrunt as v/ould y.eeg the pur-
1 T-.page H63 2 XVJ. II --De camber 19, 1931

chasin^ji power of the dollar alwa/s tlie sajiie . Professor
Fisher hcts achieved very little saccess toward making
the v/orld serioasl/ consider this method cf stabiliza-
tion. Any plan which has in it any elepients of a
metliad of attainint^ financial stability is worthy of
considera-tion and should not be tco quickly disca,rded.
Adequate consideration should be ^iven to it. The un-
certainty or variability in the scheme, .ov/ever, is a
disadvantage
.
The free racvement of ^^old should not be restricted.
Kach country should kee}) itself in readiness to take in
or pay out gold upon demand. If a normal, unhindered
exchange of gold cs,n be maintained., zlie price of gold
will seek a normal level and if tliis process is contin-
ued, the price of geld will fluctuate very little. Ab-
normal conditions are unhealthy. A human pulse that
beats too fast or too slow is abnormal and likely to be
fatal. Prices whic>i rise to too high a level or fcvll
to a low level are just as dangerous. TTormaliby by
means of stabilization is the rec^uisite of a flourish-
ing condition.
Professor Jol-in Parke Young"'" advocates the estab-
lisl-iment of an international gold f.md \7hich v.xuld con-
sist of most of the world's supply of gold. It would
operate similarly to the Gold Settlement ^und of the
1 X^''! I --November }i2, 1.^31
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United States, transfers being merely debits and
credits in the fund account, but would be intornaticn-
all/ controlled. To _^3rovide the necesaary elasticity,
credits v/oiild be granted nations, j.ist as a bank
grants credit to an individual, high-grade securities
being taxen as security. This mobilization of the
world's gold reso-irces wo ild make for greater effi-
ciency, Crold would then truly be the basis frr an
international currency. The Bank for Intern:; tional
Settlejoents at Basle, Switzerland, is a stex:) in the
direction of the establishment of such an International
gold fund.
Results To Be Secured
If the fluctuations in gold are checked and a
method of operating the gold standard discovered which
will prevent f 1 j.c tuat ions in the future, a great deal
will be acco:^plisjieu toward ores«rvl«^g thf^ world f cr
the future. International disputes and disagreements
of the future will be econoiaic in their conception.
T?ie economic relationships between nations should be
made to function smoothly. If part of the world is
economically upset, this will be impossible. At pres-
ent gold seems to be at the root of all troubles. The
problem of the world today is the problem of gold.
Grold is responsible for the unsettled conditions
throughout Europe, ITnsettled conditions react unfav-
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orably everyvhf^re . Our efforts, if directed tov/ard
the stabilization and mobilization of the v/orld*s
finances, will restore to the world a feeling of
c onfidence
,
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